9.2  |  23 May 2003 to June 2004

stressed the importance of the UN’s role in helping to move the political process forward.

Mr Brahimi eventually agreed to remain.

850.  On 6 April, in a briefing on a planned conversation with President Bush, Mr Blair’s

Private Secretary wrote that:

“We are now fighting on two fronts for the first time. We risk underestimating

Muqtada al-Sadr’s Mahdi Army. There is an effective Sunni insurgency, which is

gaining confidence from the problems we are facing with the Shia. Overall, this is the

most serious challenge we have yet faced.”473

851.  Mr Blair spoke to President Bush on 7 April.474

852.  Mr Blair did not suggest that the US should draw back from Fallujah. Instead, he

told President Bush that the decisions on how to deal with Muqtada al-Sadr and others

rightly lay with those on the ground. They needed to act “in a decisive but sensitive way”;

people needed to see that the Coalition was determined to stay to see the job done.

They agreed to send out a clear public message that there was a process leading to

transfer of authority in Iraq.

853.  Senior members of the CPA briefed the GC on developments in Fallujah on

8 April.475 Mr Richmond reported that the GC raised particular concerns that the US

blockade of the city was preventing the entry of medicines, blood, doctors and food.

By preventing civilians from crossing the bridge from one side of the town to the other,

the US military were also preventing civilians from getting to the main hospital, and

mourners getting to the cemetery to bury their dead.

854.  One minister in the GC, who came from Fallujah, resigned and it was anticipated

that others might follow.476

855.  Mr Richmond provided daily reports on the situation in Fallujah as it unfolded.

856.  On 8 April, the atmosphere was tense.477 The impact of the offensive was

heightened by TV coverage which was “inflaming opinion” and encouraging the

insurgency in the rest of the country. Action to counter that was hampered by the fact

that several nations’ terms of engagement prevented their forces from taking part in

offensive operations.

857.  In a separate message to the FCO on 8 April, Mr Richmond reported having

“expressed concern” to Ambassador Bremer “about the impact that the television

473  Minute Quarrey to Prime Minister, 6 April 2004, ‘Phone call with President Bush, 7 April’.

474  Letter Rycroft to Adams, 7 April 2004, ‘Prime Minister’s Conversation with President Bush, 7 April’.

475  Telegram 138 IraqRep to FCO London, 8 April 2004, ‘Iraq: Security discussion with IGC’.

476  Bremer LP III & McConnell M. My Year in Iraq: The Struggle to Build a Future of Hope.

Threshold, 2006.

477  Telegram 137 IraqRep to FCO London, 8 April 2004, ‘Iraq Sitrep – Morning 8 April’.

345