6.1 |
Development of the military options for an invasion of
Iraq
1417.
Lord Boyce
stated that the US:
“… started
giving us warnings … around late October/November … that we
were
probably
pushing against a closed door, but we still even then carried on
believing
we might do
it, because … that particular option seemed to be the more
sensible
one … if we
were going to commit a large‑sized landforce, because … Kuwait
is
1418.
Asked about
Sir Richard Dearlove’s evidence, Lord Boyce told the Inquiry
that he
could not
recall talking to him about the issue but Gen Özkök was
“certainly not saying
‘Don’t
bother to darken my door again’”.565
1419.
The
northern option remained the primary focus for UK planning until
early
January.
1420.
The Inquiry
accepts the strategic rationale for a northern axis,
including
the
aspiration to provide a framework which would allow other nations
to make
a military
contribution.
1421.
There are
questions, however, about whether the UK should have
given
serious
consideration to the alternatives for the UK, and discussed them
with the
US, at an
earlier stage.
1422.
The UK
recognised, from July 2002 onwards, that the proposed
northern
option for
UK land forces depended on Turkey’s agreement to the
transit
of foreign
forces; and that might be difficult to obtain. There were
serious
doubts about
whether the Turkish Government would permit the transit of
UK
(or US)
troops.
1423.
Before the
election of a new Government in Turkey, the JIC assessed
on
30 October
2002 that Turkey’s opposition could be overcome with US
pressure.
1424.
The UK
received mixed messages from Washington and Ankara during
the
autumn of
2002.
1425.
The warning
signs that Turkey might well refuse to permit the
deployment
of UK
forces led both Lt Gen Reith and the US Administration to
suggest that the
UK should
develop alternatives to the northern option.
1426.
The UK
decided US assistance would be essential for securing
Turkey’s
agreement
and that the US should take the lead in talks with the
Turkish
Government
elected in November 2002.
1427.
The
position taken by Mr Hoon, Sir Kevin Tebbit and Adm Boyce
in
discussions
with the US Administration about the UK commitment to the
northern
564
Public
hearing, 27 January 2011, pages 15‑16.
565
Public
hearing, 27 January 2011, page 16.
383