4.4 | The
search for WMD
324.
Without a
major find of WMD-related material which could “justifiably be
described
as a
smoking gun”, the “hunt for evidence” was “likely to take some
months”. Finding
“a body of
evidence” that persuaded “everybody that the war was proportionate
to the
threat” was
“unlikely”. But it needed “to be enough to convince mainstream
public, media
and
parliamentary opinion that a programme existed and had been
concealed”.
325.
Mr Hoon
thought the Government should:
•
be prepared
to publicise significant discoveries only once they had been
fully
validated
and after careful co-ordination with the US;
•
periodically
make public a consolidated and validated picture of
developments,
with the
first before the summer break, provided there was “enough material
to
justify
it”; and
•
be in a
position to respond to emerging stories, with better co-ordination
of US
and UK
public positions.
326.
The “public
position could be reinforced” if it were possible in due course
to
“involve
the UN [in] the verification process”. The ISG would host at least
one embedded
journalist.
Mr Hoon had offered a UK communications adviser in response to
a US
request for
assistance with ISG communications.
327.
Mr Watkins
wrote that a “more radical approach … could be to play down WMD
…
and focus
on other areas”; but Mr Hoon doubted that would work. In his
view, “the
WMD issue
would not go away, particular[ly] in the UK. Any attempt to brush
it aside or
downgrade
its importance” was “likely to backfire”.
328.
Asked if he
had any comments, Mr Scarlett wrote: “Not really. This is
sensible
but the
pace has hottened up. My JIC sub-committee will watch (and drive)
specific
329.
Following a
meeting of the AHMGIR on 5 June, which considered the
papers
commissioned
by Mr Cannon on 3 June, Mr Straw provided a paper on
possible
incentives
for Iraqi WMD personnel for Mr Blair to send to President
Bush.161
330.
The paper
stated that UNSCOM had produced a list of “around 6,500 Iraqis
who
had been
involved in … prohibited weapons programmes”, but “the true figure
could be
considerably
higher”. Coalition Forces had captured a few high-ranking
individuals, but
there had
been “no contact with the great mass of personnel”, which “should
be a high
priority”
for the ISG.
160
Manuscript
comment Scarlett to Manning on Letter Watkins to Manning,
4 June 2003, ‘Iraq: WMD
Detection
and Elimination: Public Handling’.
161
Letter
Straw to Blair, 5 June 2003, ‘Iraq: winning the peace’
attaching Paper [unattributed], [undated],
‘Iraqi WMD
Personnel’.
487