3.5 |
Development of UK strategy and options, September to November 2002
–
the
negotiation of resolution 1441
the wording
of the resolution had to be unequivocal: he had to co‑operate fully
and
unconditionally.
The stress on co‑operation was deliberate. His concealment
activity
was again
very clear and had been further demonstrated by his treatment of
his
son‑in‑law
who had revealed his intentions, been lured back to Iraq and
executed.
“So we had
to insert language in the resolution that made this plain; and in
particular
resist
language that meant that the words ‘final opportunity’ were diluted
by requiring
another
UNSC decision. So we also sought to ensure that in the resolution
itself, we
specifically
had a provision that a failure to comply would be itself a material
breach.
“I was kept
closely in touch with the negotiation, as was Jack Straw. We were
very
satisfied
with the outcome. It achieved our objectives. We resisted attempts
by
France to
insert language that would have required an additional decision. We
never
had a
problem with another discussion in the UNSC. What we could not
tolerate was
a situation
where Saddam continued to refuse to comply fully and
unconditionally
and yet we
were powerless to act.”301
“Then, but
even more in retrospect, UNSCR 1441 was a pivotal moment. If
Saddam
at that
point had genuinely changed; had he welcomed inspectors and
fully
co‑operated,
action would have been avoided. I made this clear to President
Bush
and he
agreed. I also think at the time those more sympathetic to Saddam
thought
he would.
The fact is he did not and the Iraq Survey Group reports show why
he
did not.”
896.
Asked for a
statement about what he thought would be achieved by
inspections
and his
expectations about Iraqi co‑operation with UNMOVIC, Mr Blair
wrote:
“It is fair
to say that I did not think that Saddam would change his behaviour.
His
record was
clear. On the other hand he might have.”302
897.
Mr Blair
cited Libya’s response to the events of 9/11, which had
condemned
the attack
and co‑operated in pursuing Al Qaida, as evidence of a country
which had
demonstrated
“a genuine change of heart, a strategic decision to alter” its
position in the
world.
Saddam Hussein’s actions and behaviour, including payments to the
families of
Palestinian
suicide bombers, had shown “a completely different attitude”.
Inspections
were
“necessary”, but they could only be successful with genuine
co‑operation.”
898.
Asked at what
point he had asked for and received advice about what
would
happen if
the inspectors did get back into Iraq, Mr Blair told the
Inquiry that “the view of
our system
was, and certainly the intelligence services, was the likelihood
that Saddam
301
Statement,
14 January 2011, pages 5‑6.
302
Statement,
14 January 2011, page 7.
359