The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
{{the
overall caveat that a further political decision would be required
to
commit UK
forces to any specific operation;
{{US
assistance would be provided in certain specified areas;
and
{{further
work was needed on the plan for the aftermath.
•
Approaches
should be made to appropriate countries for basing and
assistance.
•
The
deployment of the land package could begin from early the following
week.
•
Further
advice should be provided before the end of January on
additional
226.
On 17 January,
when Adm Boyce met General Richard Myers, Chairman of
the
US Joint
Chiefs of Staff, he reported the position on UK planning, including
that, with
Op FRESCO,
more than 50 percent of the UK Armed Forces were committed
to
operations
and “the issue of UK conventional ground forces via Turkey was
‘parked’
227.
Mr Blair had
focused on four issues:
•
targeting
legality and proportionality;
•
“what-ifs”
against Saddam Hussein’s reactions;
•
dealing
with Baghdad; and
•
“above all,
aftermath – especially in the context of catastrophic
success”.
228.
Adm Boyce was
told that a task force for the aftermath, with a
one-star
commander,
was being trained by Joint Forces Command (JFCOM) but that
should
change to a
three-star multi-national command.
229.
Sir David
Manning commented to Mr Jonathan Powell:
“Whatever
political pressure for early action, US military clearly can wait a
few more
weeks. I
think they should. We need more time to try to get the hard
evidence.”76
230.
The
decision to deploy ground forces was announced on 20
January.
231.
Mr Hoon
announced the deployment of UK ground forces, which would
“include
the
headquarters of 1 (UK) Armoured Division with support from 7
Armoured Brigade,
16 Air
Assault Brigade and 102 Logistics Brigade”, in an oral statement in
Parliament
on 20
January.77
The package
comprised “approximately 26,000 personnel”, in
addition
to
3 Commando Brigade “with around 4,000” personnel including its
support elements
which he
had announced on 7 January.
74
Minute
Williams to Head of Sec (Iraq), 17 January 2003, ‘Iraq: UK Land
Contribution’.
75
Minute
Parker to PS/Secretary of State [MOD], 17 January 2003, ‘CDS
Meeting with General Myers,
US CJCS, 17
Jan 2003’.
76
Manuscript
comment Manning to Powell on Minute Parker to PS/Secretary of State
[MOD],
17 January
2003, ‘CDS Meeting with General Myers, US CJCS, 17 Jan
2003’.
77
House of
Commons, Official
Report, 20
January 2003, columns 34-46.
418