The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
927.
The Chiefs of
Staff also placed emphasis on ensuring that the correct
structures
were in
place to disseminate intelligence effectively to commanders on the
ground.
928.
The Chiefs of
Staff agreed that a further ISTAR report would be produced
in
early 2006.
929.
During
operations, the role of a support helicopter can involve
transportation of
personnel
and supplies, surveillance or medical evacuation. That is different
from the
role of an
attack helicopter which delivers fire support to troops on the
ground. This
Section
focuses on support helicopters and how they complemented the land
operation
in
Iraq.
930.
The term
“battlefield helicopter” can cover both types but in the material
that
follows it
appears to refer largely to support helicopters.
931.
The UK’s
campaign in Iraq, following the invasion, was classified as a
medium
scale
operation in terms of MOD planning assumptions. The MOD told the
Inquiry that,
in 2003 for
a medium scale ground operation, the maximum number of
helicopters
would be:
•
21 heavy
support helicopters;
•
41 medium
support helicopters; and
•
44 light
support helicopters.488
932.
The MOD told
the Inquiry that the UK’s support helicopter fleet in 2003
comprised
a “forward
fleet” of:
•
31 Chinook
Mk2/2a;
•
18 Merlin
Mk3;
•
33 Sea King
Mk4; and
933.
Those aircraft
were supported by Gazelle and Lynx light helicopters.
934.
An MOD report
published in July 2003 stated that 137 helicopters were
deployed
as part of
the combat operations between 19 March 2003 and 15 April
2003.490
Those
figures are
broken down in Table 2.
488
Letter MOD
to the Iraq Inquiry, 31 January 2011, ‘MOD Evidence – Equipment
Issues’ attaching Report,
September
2003, ‘Annex H – Maximum Scales of Effort’.
489
Paper
[MOD], 1 March 2011, ‘Request for Evidence, Support
Helicopters’.
490
Ministry of
Defence, Operations
in Iraq: First Reflections, July
2003.
158