The Report of the Iraq Inquiry

• Iraq had “provided an updated list of 430 key technical staff involved in the past

programme and their current work locations. The list covered the great majority of

essential staff.” The IAEA was “able to interview 17 individuals selected by the IAEA

at locations chosen by the IAEA”. Some restrictions were imposed at the beginning,

“when interviewees first refused to be seen without the presence of an Iraqi observer.

Subsequently interviewees accepted to be seen alone, but requested that their

interviews be taped. Ultimately, two individuals accepted to be interviewed in private

and without being taped. Most of the interviews proved to be of significant help in

improving the IAEA’s understanding of the current state of Iraq’s nuclear related

capabilities.”

• Before inspections were suspended, the IAEA was “able to resolve the modalities”

for interviews outside Iraq.

• Since the inception of a system to review applications to sell or supply single or

dual‑use items, in May 2002, the IAEA had examined 9,965 contract communications.

Of those, 0.1 percent had contained prohibited items.

• The IAEA had “repeatedly called on States to provide actionable information of

direct and current value” relevant to its mandate. “Towards the end of the recent

inspections”, there had been “an increase in the provision of such information”,

but the “nature and extent of that information remained limited”.

• The Iraqi declaration submitted on 7 December 2002 “did not provide any significant

new information” relevant to the issues outstanding since December 1998.

The report concluded that “as the sole legal authority to verify Iraq’s nuclear activities”,

the IAEA remained “ready, subject to Security Council guidance, to resume its verification

activities as soon as conditions permit”.

73. Mr Tony Brenton, Chargé d’Affaires at the British Embassy Washington, discussed

the role of UNMOVIC with Mr John Bolton, US Under Secretary of State for Arms Control

and International Security, on 15 April.37

74. Mr Brenton reported that the UK should not expect the US to agree any role

for UNMOVIC in the short term. The US had particular concerns about UNMOVIC

inspectors handling sensitive intelligence on countries outside Iraq that revealed details

about global WMD networks, including procurement and financing. Even in the longer

term, UNMOVIC would have to be reformed before the US would consider involving it.

The US was willing to work with the UK on other ways to validate WMD finds.

75. Mr Brenton advised that the US argument about intelligence had evident force.

The UK would need to have a good answer if it was to maintain its current position

on UNMOVIC.

76. The Cabinet Office reported to Sir David Manning that there was a “consensus that

UNMOVIC/IAEA should not – and cannot – return to Iraq in the immediate future”, but in

a meeting on 16 April officials had:

37 Telegram 507 Washington to FCO London, 15 April 2003, ‘US/Iraq: Role of UNMOVIC’.

440