3.4 |
Development of UK strategy and options, late July to 14 September
2002
57.
It is clear
from the documents on the No.10 files that Mr Blair had read
them.
58.
When No.10
asked for reading material for Mr Gordon Brown, the Chancellor
of the
Exchequer,
Mr Scarlett provided the same documents.18
59.
Further
information from the DIS ‘Proliferation Study of Iraq’ and its
‘aide memoire
on WMD and
Proliferation’ can be found in Section 4.2.
60.
On 5
August, the JIC provided further advice on the attitudes of
regional
states to
military action against Iraq, which it described as a “key
issue”
facing Ministers.
61.
The
judgements in the Assessment reflected the conditions which
had
already
been identified in policy papers and discussions.
62.
The
Assessment identified that the US must continue to convince
regional
governments
of its determination and ability to remove Saddam Hussein
quickly
and offer
credible plans for the aftermath.
63.
At the request
of the MOD, the JIC reconsidered the judgements in its
Assessment
of 19 April
(see Section 3.3), ‘Iraq: Regional Attitudes’, on regional
attitudes to military
action and
how much support or opposition they might offer.19
It also
assessed the
impact of
military action on the internal stability of regional
states.
64.
In its
discussion of the draft Assessment on 31 July the JIC identified
Iraq as:
“… an
immensely important issue for Ministers and the paper would
therefore be
read widely
and with great interest. It looked specifically at the implications
of military
options but
needed to spell out more, the huge ambiguities and doubts in the
region
about the
timing of any US attack, as well as the likely aftermath … The
success of
any US
action would also depend partly on whether the objective was for
the West
to have
control over Iraq in the longer term … The overview … was rather
negative
but in fact
governments in the region would rather like to be rid of
Saddam;
“the key
issue facing Ministers now was gauging what Iraq’s neighbours would
say
… the draft
Assessment was a little too conventional on this point and did not
really
get beneath
the surface … Iran’s reactions were the most difficult to gauge
but
would be
crucial and would merit fuller treatment in a separate
paper.”20
18
Minute
Scarlett to Rycroft, 5 September 2002, ‘Iraq: Classified Reading
Material’.
19
JIC
Assessment, 5 August 2002, ‘Iraq: Regional Attitudes and Impact of
Military Action’.
20
Minutes, 31
July 2002, JIC meeting.
103