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6.4  |  Planning and preparation for a post-Saddam Hussein Iraq, mid-2001 to January 2003
339.  The authors stated that they were aware of MOD contingency planning for
military action against Iraq, but not of its extent.
340.  DFID was not involved in cross-Whitehall planning on Iraq until
September 2002.
341.  During the first half of 2002, DFID involvement in Whitehall discussion of Iraq was
limited to the humanitarian impact of the proposed Goods Review List (GRL), addressed
in more detail in Section 3.2. The GRL was adopted in May 2002 and introduced fast
track procedures for the export to Iraq of all goods other than WMD- and military-related
items of concern.192 DFID did not participate in discussion of post-conflict issues or wider
Iraq strategy.
342.  On 10 May, DFID officials recommended to Ms Clare Short, International
Development Secretary, that the department review its existing humanitarian programme
for Iraq to inform its strategy for the next three years.193
343.  In their advice of 10 May, officials described the purpose of DFID’s existing
(2002/03) programme for Iraq, as being: “to improve the provision of effective
humanitarian support by UN agencies and NGOs for the poor affected by internal and
regional conflict in Iraq”.
344.  Officials explained that there were problems assessing the humanitarian situation
in Iraq: “The GoI’s [Government of Iraq’s] strict censorship policy of key data has
inhibited comprehensive analyses from other [non-UN] sources … UN reports offer the
most reliable means of reaching whatever information is available.” Although DFID had
conducted “informal consultations” with UN agencies, those agencies respected Iraqi
Government conditions on sharing information.
345.  The paper stated that, despite the shortage of reliable survey evidence assessing
human development in Iraq, there was a consensus in the international development
community that the situation had “deteriorated severely” since 1990. UN/Government
of Iraq joint sectoral surveys showed a “general deterioration” in areas such as health,
nutrition, and child and maternal mortality. UNICEF assessed that, while the food ration
provided under OFF had arrested the rate of decline in the humanitarian situation, it had
not reversed it, and interference by the Iraqi Government meant that the benefits had not
been evenly distributed across Iraq. UNICEF was also concerned that there was a high
level of dependency on the food ration.
192  Minute DFID [junior official] to Private Secretary [DFID], 10 May 2002, ‘Proposed humanitarian activities
2002/03’.
193  Minute Western Asia Department [junior official] to Private Secretary [DFID], 10 May 2002,
‘Proposed humanitarian activities 2002/03’ attaching Paper Western Asia Department, May 2002,
‘Iraq – Humanitarian Assistance Programme for 2002/03’.
169
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