6.4 |
Planning and preparation for a post-Saddam Hussein Iraq, mid-2001
to January 2003
339.
The authors
stated that they were aware of MOD contingency planning
for
military
action against Iraq, but not of its extent.
340.
DFID was
not involved in cross-Whitehall planning on Iraq until
September 2002.
341.
During the
first half of 2002, DFID involvement in Whitehall discussion of
Iraq was
limited to
the humanitarian impact of the proposed Goods Review List (GRL),
addressed
in more
detail in Section 3.2. The GRL was adopted in May 2002 and
introduced fast
track
procedures for the export to Iraq of all goods other than WMD- and
military-related
items of
concern.192
DFID did
not participate in discussion of post-conflict issues or
wider
Iraq
strategy.
342.
On 10 May,
DFID officials recommended to Ms Clare Short,
International
Development
Secretary, that the department review its existing humanitarian
programme
for Iraq to
inform its strategy for the next three years.193
343.
In their
advice of 10 May, officials described the purpose of DFID’s
existing
(2002/03)
programme for Iraq, as being: “to improve the provision of
effective
humanitarian
support by UN agencies and NGOs for the poor affected by internal
and
regional
conflict in Iraq”.
344.
Officials
explained that there were problems assessing the humanitarian
situation
in Iraq:
“The GoI’s [Government of Iraq’s] strict censorship policy of key
data has
inhibited
comprehensive analyses from other [non-UN] sources … UN reports
offer the
most
reliable means of reaching whatever information is available.”
Although DFID had
conducted
“informal consultations” with UN agencies, those agencies respected
Iraqi
Government
conditions on sharing information.
345.
The paper
stated that, despite the shortage of reliable survey evidence
assessing
human
development in Iraq, there was a consensus in the international
development
community
that the situation had “deteriorated severely” since 1990.
UN/Government
of Iraq
joint sectoral surveys showed a “general deterioration” in areas
such as health,
nutrition,
and child and maternal mortality. UNICEF assessed that, while the
food ration
provided
under OFF had arrested the rate of decline in the humanitarian
situation, it had
not
reversed it, and interference by the Iraqi Government meant that
the benefits had not
been evenly
distributed across Iraq. UNICEF was also concerned that there was a
high
level of
dependency on the food ration.
192
Minute DFID
[junior official] to Private Secretary [DFID], 10 May 2002,
‘Proposed humanitarian activities
2002/03’.
193
Minute
Western Asia Department [junior official] to Private Secretary
[DFID], 10 May 2002,
‘Proposed humanitarian
activities 2002/03’ attaching Paper Western Asia Department, May
2002,
‘Iraq – Humanitarian
Assistance Programme for 2002/03’.
169