The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
780.
There is no
indication that the Cabinet Office paper of 1 November
or
the
individual papers on post-conflict Iraq prepared for the AHGI by
other
departments
were shown to Mr Blair in the weeks before Christmas 2002, or
that
Mr Blair
asked to see advice from officials on post-conflict
issues.
781.
Mr Blair
did invite the views of academics working outside
government.
782.
In
November, he and Mr Straw discussed Iraq with a number of
academics.
783.
During
November a number of academics contributed to government discussion
of
post-conflict
Iraq.
784.
On 5 November,
Mr Simon Fraser, FCO Director for Strategy and
Innovation,
reported to
No.10 and a large number of FCO officials, including Sir Michael
Jay,
Mr Ricketts
and Mr McDonald, a discussion on Iraq with Dr Charles Tripp of
the
School of
Oriental and African Studies (SOAS).385
785.
Mr Fraser
highlighted a number of points raised by Dr Tripp, including his
view that:
“Ordinary
Iraqis were fairly passive towards the regime … Some among the Shia
still
considered
Saddam to be the creature of America – ‘without the Americans he
would
not be
there now’. They would be cautious in welcoming any incoming army
until
they were
convinced that Saddam really was on the way out …
“Analysts
who tried to divide Iraq into three distinct ethnic/religious
groups were
being over
simplistic …
“Federalism
was not an option for Iraq … and could lead to polarisation between
the
north and
south with a weak middle between …
“Establishing
a representative government based on democratic principles would
be
costly both
in political investment, money and military effort. There was no
evidence
that the US
had either the stamina or the knowledge to carry this through. Many
of
those … who
were talking about democracy in Iraq knew nothing about the
country.
A long-term
international presence – whether US or UN-led – would be
extremely
vulnerable
to Iraqi opposition movements, as well as to other elements such
as
Al Qaida
who would want to see it fail … If this scenario were too daunting,
then
the best
thing might [be] to go for a short-term fix involving one or more
military
strong men
…
“Islamism
was an underlying force in Iraq … If it came to a post-Saddam Iraq
we
would need
to have thought through in advance how to respond …”
385
Minute
Fraser to Reynolds, 5 November 2002, ‘Iraq Futures’.
244