The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
our objectives
and specify ongoing and future actions”.390
It set out
shared (US and
UK) objectives
and UK actions on security, intelligence, infrastructure, media
and
CPA
personnel.
704.
On
infrastructure, the objective was a radical and rapid improvement
in basic
service
provision (particularly water, electricity and fuel) to maintain
Iraqi consent. The
UK had
contributed US$30m to the US$127m Essential Services Plan; the
balance
would come
from the CPA. No other UK actions were identified.
705.
On the media,
the objective was to counter distorted reporting by Al Jazeera
and
other
satellite channels. The UK would provide support to the Iraqi Media
Network, the
CPA, and
for the longer-term development of indigenous Iraqi
media.
706.
On CPA
personnel, the objective was to provide more specialist support for
the
CPA in
Baghdad and the provinces. The UK was recruiting 37 specialists for
CPA(South)
and would
provide more “as requested”, had selected four individuals to head
CPA
Governorate
Teams, and would provide additional information and SSR specialists
for
CPA(Baghdad).
707.
Sir Nigel and
Dr Rice went through the Action Plan during Sir Nigel’s visit
to
Washington
from 11 to 12 September.391
Sir Nigel
reported to Mr Blair:
“We [US and
UK] share objectives; and
there now appear to be detailed plans
under
development by the CPA in all the priority areas.”
708.
Sir Nigel and
Dr Rice agreed that there would be regular video
conferences
between
London, Washington and Baghdad “to ensure we are all working from
the
same
script”.
709.
Hard
Lessons described how,
in July and August 2003, the CPA had developed
a request
for additional funding for reconstruction prompted by the projected
US$23bn
financing
gap in Iraq’s draft 2004 budget.392
Ambassador
Bremer sent a request for
US$20.3bn
to Washington in early August; the request was formally submitted
to
Congress on
6 September.
710.
The CPA
advised Congress that Iraq required between US$50bn and
US$75bn
for
reconstruction; it planned to present a “rich package of projects”
to the forthcoming
Madrid
Donors Conference to attract funding from the international
community.
390
Letter
Sheinwald to Rice, 11 September 2003, ‘Iraq’ attaching Note 10
Downing Street, 10 September
2003,
‘Iraq: UK/US Action Plan 10 September’.
391
Minute
Sheinwald to Prime Minister, 14 September 2003, ‘Visit to
Washington’.
392
Bowen SW
Jr. Hard
Lessons: The Iraq Reconstruction Experience. U.S.
Government Printing
Office,
2009.
122