The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
to bring
them to book. By contrast, conventional weapons are cheaper, easier
to
procure,
and offer equal or greater effectiveness against traditional
targets …”46
94.
In the context
of reports of fissile material being available on the black market,
the
JIC
concluded in April 1994 that it was:
“…
extremely unlikely that a terrorist group could produce even a
crude nuclear
device; nor
is there any evidence that any group has contemplated the use
of
nuclear
weapons. A more plausible scenario might be the dispersal of
radioactive
materials
…
“We believe
that terrorists would not be able to acquire or deploy a nuclear
weapon;
radiological
attacks are … unlikely.”47
95.
The Assessment
also stated:
“Attacks
involving chemical or biological agents are also unlikely
…”
96.
In an
Assessment in July 1996, responding to a G7 declaration that
special attention
should be
paid to the threat of the use of nuclear, biological and chemical
materials for
terrorist
purposes, the JIC stated:
“There is
no indication of any terrorist or other group showing interest in
the use
of nuclear,
biological or chemical (NBC) materials against the UK. For a
number
of reasons,
conventional weapons are likely to remain more attractive for
terrorist
purposes.
But last year’s nerve agent attack in Tokyo [the use of sarin by
the
Aum Shinrikyo
sect in the Tokyo underground in March 1995] will have
heightened
interest
and, with ever more NBC information publicly available, hoaxes
threatening
NBC use are
likely to become more difficult to assess.”48
97.
After Usama
Bin Laden returned to Afghanistan, evidence accumulated of
his
interest in
chemical and biological materials.
98.
Usama Bin
Laden had first become known as a high-profile supporter of
Islamist
extremism
when fighting the Soviet forces in Afghanistan in the
1980s.49
99.
He founded the
international terrorist group known as Al Qaida in 1989,
“dedicated
to opposing
‘un-Islamic’ governments in Muslim countries with force and
violence”. He
was based
in Afghanistan and Pakistan from 1989 to 1991, when he moved to
Sudan.
Usama Bin
Laden returned to Afghanistan in 1996.
46
Review of
Intelligence on Weapons of Mass Destruction [“The
Butler Report”], 14 July 2004, HC 898,
paragraph
113.
47
Review of
Intelligence on Weapons of Mass Destruction [“The
Butler Report”], 14 July 2004, HC 898,
paragraph
114.
48
Review of
Intelligence on Weapons of Mass Destruction [“The
Butler Report”], 14 July 2004, HC 898,
paragraph
116.
49
Review of
Intelligence on Weapons of Mass Destruction [“The
Butler Report”], 14 July 2004, HC 898,
paragraph
117.
32