The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
193.
The MOD
suggested it could use the cover of operations in Afghanistan “to
handle
these UORs
in a discreet fashion”, with costs being attributed to the same
“ticket”.
Alternatively,
there could be “some reprioritisation” of in-year resources: “Costs
would
then be
claimed back retrospectively once a more general agreement has been
reached
with the
Treasury on how to deal with the additional costs of any Iraq
operations.”
194.
On
18 September, Mr McKane, now MOD DGRP, wrote he was
“distinctly uneasy”
about both
options.89
He proposed
to either:
•
urgently
press for agreement to open up a dialogue with Treasury officials
so
that the
funding of Iraq-related UORs was put “on to a sound footing”;
or
•
if AM
Stirrup deemed the Special Forces’ UORs “to be of such a high
priority that
he can
re-prioritise the Equipment Plan, then he should do so”. The
Defence
budget
would have to absorb the costs.
195.
On
19 September, Sir Kevin Tebbit’s Private Office replied,
agreeing with
Mr McKane’s
advice that it would be “improper” to use the Afghanistan budget
for Iraq
and that it
would, “in any case, be evident to Treasury in view of the ‘item by
item’
requirement
for scrutiny”.90
196.
Sir Kevin did
not, however, agree Mr McKane’s suggestion that the UORs
could
be met from
the equipment budget through re-prioritisation “in view of the
precedent
this could
set”. Sir Kevin advised Mr Hoon to discuss the issue with
Mr Brown “as soon
as
possible”, which would be at their meeting scheduled for
23 September. Once that
agreement
was in place, the MOD could proceed, “either invisibly or
otherwise”.
197.
Mr Hoon’s
Private Office decided not to show him the note from
16 September as
a result of
the comments from Mr McKane and Sir Kevin.91
It
requested further advice,
“when
appropriate”.
198.
Having seen Dr
Cholerton’s minute of 13 September, Air Chief Marshal Sir
Peter
Squire,
Chief of the Air Staff, wrote to Adm Boyce on
16 September.92
He believed
that
the
situation had changed “considerably” since the Chiefs of Staff last
discussed UORs.
He
wrote:
“Political
statements from both London and Washington have confirmed that a
UN
resolution
will, in the first instance be pursued but that, if this fails
military action will
follow.
Under these circumstances, contingency action to prepare for the
eventuality
that the UN
resolution is not effective would seem entirely
appropriate.”
89
Minute
McKane to Sec(HSF)2, 18 September 2002, ‘Op ROW: SF Urgent
Operational Requirements
(UORs)’.
90
Minute
APS/PUS [MOD] to Sec(HSF)2, 18 September 2002, ‘Op ROW: SF
Urgent Operational
Requirements
(UORs)’. The MOD has confirmed that the date provided on the paper,
18 September, is
incorrect
and is content for the Inquiry to use
19 September.
91
Minute
APS/Secretary of State [MOD] to Sec(HSF)2, 18 September, ‘Op
ROW: SF Urgent Operational
Requirements
(UORs)’.
92
Minute CAS
to CDS, 16 September 2002, ‘Iraq – Urgent Operational
Requirements’.
30