The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
•
“A move
against the Kurds either immediately before or after a
Coalition
invasion …”
321.
Mr Scarlett
reminded Sir David that the JIC had judged, “over many months”,
that
“once the
invasion starts Saddam’s regime is likely to prove brittle and fold
quickly”.
It was
therefore correct to prepare a military strategy to “make this
‘quickly’ very
quick indeed”.
322.
Mr Scarlett
wrote that circumstances required the UK to look carefully for
areas
in which
things might go wrong. The remaining questions in his mind, other
than the
potential
use of CBW and revenge tactics, were:
“•
Tough
resistance from individual military units capable at least in the
available
time of
inflicting significant casualties on the attacking
force.
•
Uprisings
against regime forces or general blood letting especially in
southern
cities such
as Basra. This is our proposed Area of Operations (AOR). If
you
have an
AOR, you cannot disclaim responsibility for what happens within
it.
•
The end
game in Baghdad especially the fate of Saddam himself … how
do
we ensure
that Saddam’s power in his own capital is truly broken
…?”
323.
In
preparation for Mr Blair’s meeting with President Bush on 31
January, the
MOD drew
attention to the implications which any delay in military action
beyond
the spring
would have for its ability to provide a major contribution to
military
action, and
the need for the US and UK to have agreed military
objectives.
324.
The MOD
briefing of 29 January comprised a general update and sections
on
targeting,
“aftermath”, and Saddam Hussein’s options, including “Fortress
Baghdad”.114
325.
The MOD “line
to take” suggested for Mr Blair was that, if military operations
were
to be
delayed beyond April/May, the UK would “struggle to put together
this scale of
force again
for the autumn, especially if the fire strike continues. So
militarily we could
bear some
delay but not too much.”
326.
The background
briefing for Mr Blair advised that, if operations were not
initiated in
the spring,
the UK would “face some awkward choices”. Some “key elements of the
UK
contribution
were unique” – including the Commando Brigade, the Assault Brigade
and
a
specialist helicopter carrier ship. The MOD suggested:
“If
operations were not going to start until the autumn, we would need
to consider
bringing
some forces back to the UK in the meantime. Our ability to provide
a
major
contribution later in the year will also be severely constrained if
the fire strike
continues
beyond the spring.”
114
Letter
Williams to Rycroft, 29 January 2003, ‘Prime Minister’s Briefing –
Iraq’.
434