The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
187.
Other key
elements from the Assessment were:
•
There were
suggestions that UK interests were “on a par
with US targets
for some
Islamist terrorists” although it was “likely that the US” would
“remain
the priority
for most”.
•
The threat
of a “conventional’ attack” in the UK remained “a major
concern”.
•
The
“threat of
CB attacks in the UK” remained;
they “would probably be
small-scale
(but potentially high impact)”.
•
There had
been “a particularly high number of threat reports” during the
previous
“two
months”, although “only a small proportion” would “materialise into
terrorist
action”.
•
The “upward
trend” was “likely to continue” as a possible conflict with
Iraq
approached.
•
Usama Bin
Laden’s statement of 11 February was “unlikely to be the
trigger
for attacks
by Islamist extremists”, although it would “enable him to take
credit
for attacks
conducted in response to a war with Iraq”.
188.
An update of
the 10 February Assessment, of terrorist activity which
would
be triggered
by military action in Iraq, was produced by the JIC on 12
March.50
That
is addressed
in Section 3.8.
189.
The FCO
advised No.10 on 10 February that only four votes in the
Security
Council
could be counted on for a second resolution. It would be
impossible
to obtain
support for a resolution explicitly authorising the use of “all
necessary
means” to
disarm Iraq.
190.
The key
element in the resolution would be a sufficient link to
resolution
1441 to
establish that the Security Council has concluded that Iraq had
failed
to take
its final opportunity.
191.
The FCO
identified three options and planned to discuss the approach
with
the US
before tabling a draft resolution following Dr Blix and
Dr ElBaradei’s report
to the
Security Council on 14 February.
192.
On 7 February,
Mr Peter Ricketts, FCO Political Director, reported to
Mr Straw
that the
UK’s strategy on Iraq was approaching “the critical
phase”.51
Sir
Jeremy
Greenstock
had advised that here was “no prospect” of getting an explicit “all
necessary
means”
provision in a resolution. Lord Goldsmith had been consulted about
more
implicit options.
50
JIC
Assessment, 12 March 2003, ‘International Terrorism: War with Iraq:
Update’.
51
Minute
Ricketts to Private Secretary [FCO], 7 February 2003, ‘Iraq
Strategy’.
216