10.3 |
Reconstruction: oil, commercial interests, debt relief, asylum and
stabilisation policy
123.
At the meeting
with President Bush, Mr Blair suggested that a UN badge
was
needed for
what the US and UK wanted to do, and would help with the
humanitarian
124.
The record of
the meeting between President Bush and Mr Blair does not
show
any
discussion of oil issues.
125.
The first
meeting of the US/UK/Australia Working Group on Day After
Economic
Issues took
place in Washington on 5 February.66
126.
The British
Embassy Washington reported that the DoD had detailed
contingency
plans to
protect and restore the oil sector. The DoD was well aware of the
importance
of the oil
sector for reconstruction. In the best case (minimal damage,
current levels of
outputs
restored after two to three months), the DoD estimated that the
sector could
make a net
contribution of US$12bn in the first year after any conflict; in
the worst case
it could
impose a net cost of US$8bn.
127.
The Working
Group agreed to co-operate on defining practical economic steps
to
be taken in
the first three to six months of military occupation.
128.
The FCO member
of the UK delegation, the Economic Adviser for the Middle
East
and North
Africa, reported separately to Mr Drummond that:
“DoD are
ploughing ahead with detailed contingency planning for the oil
sector
in the
initial military administration phase. But … there was a
conspicuous
disconnect
between this and civilian planning for economic management and
policy
development
within Iraq …”67
129.
Mr Marc
Grossman, US Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs,
and
Mr Douglas
Feith, US Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, gave evidence on
US
post‑conflict
plans to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on 11
February.68
130.
The British
Embassy Washington reported that Mr Grossman’s and
Mr Feith’s
message to
the Foreign Relations Committee was “liberation not occupation”,
with
an assurance
that the US did not want to control Iraq’s economic
resources.
65
Letter
Manning to McDonald, 31 January 2003, ‘Iraq: Prime Minister’s
Conversation with President Bush
on 31
January’.
66
Telegram
169 Washington to FCO London, 6 February 2003, ‘Iraq: Meeting of
Trilateral Working Group
on ‘Day
After’ Economic Issues: Short Term Reconstruction’.
67
Teleletter
FCO [junior official] to Drummond, 6 February 2003, ‘Iraq: Meeting
of US/UK/Australian
Working
Group on ‘Day After’ Economic Issues: Assessment and Follow
Up’.
68
Telegram
196, Washington to FCO, 12 February 2003, ‘Iraq ‘Day After’: US
Makes Initial Planning
Public’.
393