The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
“… asserted
that our [the UK’s] line had always been ‘in together, out
together’ –
quoting PM
Blair as his authority. My response was that we had defined
strategic
objectives
in Iraq which, when met, would see our departure … While 2009
seems
light years
away at present, and retaining flexibility against uncertain future
events
will always
offer advantages, some further definition on the nature of both our
long
term
security relationship with Iraq, and the time/events that would
lead to it, would
be helpful
as bilateral arrangements to succeed the proposed Dec 08 UNSCR
start
to be
discussed.”
478.
NSID(OD) met
for the first time on 8 October.230
The main aim
of the meeting,
according
to the Cabinet Office steering brief for Mr Brown, was for him
to “inform
colleagues
of the content of your statement on Iraq, focusing on the military
plans and
economic
initiative”.
479.
Ahead of the
meeting, Mr Prentice reported that political progress in
Baghdad
remained
slow.231
Key
legislation remained stalled, with the Kurdish parties refusing
to
concede
ground on revenue sharing and hydrocarbons legislation. Prime
Minister Maliki
still
lacked a majority to complete his Cabinet and drive through
legislation. The UK
continued
to work for the reconvening of the Executive Group but this seemed
unlikely
until after
Eid, which began the following week.
480.
At the meeting
on 8 October, Mr Brown informed his colleagues that he would
be
making a
statement on Iraq in Parliament that afternoon, which would reflect
the three
key
elements he had focused on during his recent visit to
Iraq:
•
political
reconciliation;
•
economic
reconstruction; and
•
the
security situation.232
481.
There had been
little progress on political reconciliation but
economic
reconstruction
in Basra was making better progress, largely as a result of the
improved
security
environment. The security situation had improved in recent weeks,
making
possible
the handover of Basra Palace to the Iraqis in September and raising
the
possibility
of PIC in December. If the current trend continued, it should be
possible to
reduce UK
forces to around 2,500 by spring 2008.
482.
In discussion,
it was noted that progress on the security situation had been
due
to a number
of factors, not least of which was the JAM cease-fire. That
cease-fire
230
Minute
Cabinet Office [junior official] to Prime Minister, 5 October 2007,
‘NSID(OD) Iraq Meeting –
Steering
Brief: Monday 8 October 09:30’.
231
eGram
41205/07 Baghdad to FCO London, 7 October 2007, ‘Iraq: Political
Update: Background for
NSID, 8
October’.
232
Minutes, 8
October 2007, NSID(OD) meeting.
272