The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
379.
The JIC
Assessment stated:
“The
relative weakness of Iraqi forces in the South and the fact that
those forces will
face the
brunt of a Coalition attack mean southern
Iraq is the most likely area for
the first use
of CBW against both Coalition Forces and the local
population.”145
380.
The Assessment
added that one report from August 2002 had indicated:
“… Iraqi
plans to use CBW in southern Iraq to cause mass casualties among
the
Shia in the
event of a US-led attack. The regime would seek to pin the blame
for the
resulting
high-level of casualties on the Coalition.”
381.
Responding to
a series of questions from Mr Blair (see Section 6.2), the
MOD
advised on
24 February that Iraq retained “the capability (through a variety
of means)
pre-emptively
to deliver CBW against Coalition Forces in Kuwait. The question is
one of
intent.”146
There was
“no intelligence” to indicate that the regime was “currently
planning
a
pre-emptive strike”. In the MOD view that was “highly unlikely
whilst Saddam believes
war can be
averted”. If he was convinced that war was “inevitable and
imminent” that
“might make
a pre-emptive move more attractive” but it was “more likely that
Saddam
would
deploy CBW after the onset of the campaign”.
382.
In its
Assessment, ‘Iraq: Prospects in the North’, of how Iraq would
respond in
northern
Iraq to a coalition attack, issued on 26 February, the JIC
judged:
“The Iraqi
regime would be willing to use CBW against the Coalition
and
383.
The Assessment
made clear that that judgement was a continuation from
earlier Assessments.
384.
In its Note,
‘Saddam’s Plan for Baghdad’ issued on 13 March, the JIC stated
that
it had
“previously judged that Saddam would be willing to use chemical and
biological
warfare
(CBW) against the Coalition and the Iraqi
population”.148
385.
The JIC
assessed that it was “likely that, even if it had not done so
already, the
regime
would use CBW in the defence of Baghdad if it could”. That “would
depend on
the
survival of leadership command and control, and of some delivery
means, such as
artillery”.
Intelligence indicated that the Special Republican Guard and
Special Security
Organisation
retained “control over CBW munitions” and that the regime had
“been
distributing
protective CBW clothing and medical supplies for treating exposure
to nerve
agents to
units around Baghdad”.
145
JIC
Assessment, 19 February 2003, ‘Southern Iraq: What’s In
Store?’
146
Letter
Watkins to Rycroft, 24 February 2003, ‘Iraq: Political and Military
Questions’.
147
JIC
Assessment, 26 February 2003, ‘Iraq: Prospects in the
North’.
148
Note JIC,
13 March 2003, ‘Saddam’s Plan for Baghdad’.
360