The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
absolutely
nothing to suggest that this co-operation was full, immediate
and
unconditional.
It was actually not full, not immediate. In fact, even Blix himself
said
it wasn’t
immediate even on 7 March and was not unconditional.
“In
addition to that I had I think JIC Assessments as well … where it
was clear that
Saddam was
putting heavy pressure internally on people not to co-operate
…”326
770.
The Inquiry
asked Mr Blair whether the process had involved only No.10 or
if he
had
consulted more widely, Mr Blair stated:
“I am sure
I would have spoken to Jack [Straw] particularly at the time … I
don’t
recollect …
This literally was the whole time a conversation … [O]ur view
was
that he
[Saddam Hussein] was not co-operating in the terms of 1441, and
that …
remains my
view today that he wasn’t, and that he … never had any intention
of
doing
that.
“Now it is
correct … that he was offering up more, but … even in February he
wasn’t
offering up
what they were asking him.”327
771.
Asked whether
he was comfortable with the situation whereby the Prime
Minister
confirmed
the existence of a further material breach at a time when the head
of the IAEA
had
reported there was no nuclear programme and the head of UNMOVIC was
reporting
improved
co-operation. Mr Straw replied:
“Yes … and
if I had not been I wouldn’t have stayed in the Cabinet
…”328
772.
Mr Straw
added that the two tests in OP4 were “conjunctive” not
“disjunctive”,
and that:
“What OP4
talks about is false statements or omissions in the declarations.
Well, the
declaration
was incomplete. There was no question about that. And
…
“… They did
fail to comply fully. The obligation on them was not to comply a
bit …
The
obligation on Iraq was to comply fully. It is a positive obligation
on them, not
a negative
one, not to disregard the whole of the resolution, and they had
failed
773.
The Government
motion tabled for the debate on 18 March included
provisions
asking the
House of Commons to:
•
note that
in the 130 days since resolution 1441 was adopted Iraq had
not
co‑operated
actively, unconditionally and immediately with the
weapons
inspectors,
and had rejected the final opportunity to comply and is in
further
326
Public
hearing, 21 January 2011, pages 111-112.
327
Public
hearing, 21 January 2011, pages 112-113.
328
Public
hearing, 2 February 2011, page 86.
329
Public
hearing, 2 February 2011, page 87.
138