9.6 |
27 June 2007 to April 2008
193.
JAM in Basra
called a month-long cease-fire, beginning on 13
August.87
Sir John Scarlett
told the Inquiry that:
“… the
cease-fire for a month on 13 August worked straight away.
There was
an immediate
falling away of attacks, and it then carried on. It went beyond
the
month and
it became effectively a permanent feature. So it was
remarkably
successful.”
194.
The cease-fire
was observed not just by mainstream JAM locally, but also by
a
number of
the Special Groups.88
195.
A summary of
the negotiations with JAM1 written by a senior government
official
specialising
in the Middle East (1) in November 2007, said that the reduction in
violence:
“… began on
13 August, on the following terms:
•
JAM in
Basra would suspend their attacks on the coalition. [JAM1]
would
work to
bring the Secret Cells under his control and in particular
guarantee
a peaceful
withdrawal from Basra Palace. MND(SE) would suspend
their
detention
campaign but would retain the right to strike anyone
targeting
coalition
forces and to interdict weapons smugglers.
•
MND(SE)
released four JAM detainees as requested by [JAM1] to begin
the
process of
de-escalation. If violence remained low, [JAM1] and
MND(SE)
would
negotiate a timetable for the eventual release of all
MND(SE)
detainees,
including [JAM1] himself. Discussions would continue on
the
political
and development themes, with the aim of JAM and the
Sadrists’
full
participation in the political process in Basra. GOC MND(SE) formed
a
steering
group to guide the talks.”89
196.
On 13 August,
a government official working closely with the military
commented
on the
“welcome gear change” brought by the releases:
“… we are
keen to think ahead so that we are clear what we need to do –
and
how –
once the month’s cease-fire period comes to an end. We sense that
timing
will be crucial
at the end of this period so we will want to be prepared and not
waste
any time.
For now, we need to … work on … who/how we inform/request
permission
at the end
of the cease-fire period.”90
87
Private
hearing, 10 June 2010, page 41.
88
Private
hearing SIS3, 2010, page 62.
89
Minute
senior government official specialising in the Middle East (1) to
Lyall Grant, 9 November 2007,
‘[NAME OF
OPERATION]: Negotiations with JAM in Basrah’.
90
Email
official working closely with the military, 13 August 2007, ‘[NAME
OF OPERATION] - Looking
Ahead’.
219