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3.6  |  Development of UK strategy and options, November 2002 to January 2003
155.  Mr Straw also posed and then answered four “key questions” which arose from
the resolution:
What constituted a material breach?
Who would decide what happened if there was a material breach?
Whether there would be a second Security Council resolution if military action
proved necessary?
Whether, if military action was necessary, the House of Commons would be able
to vote on it and, if so, when?
156.  Addressing what would constitute a material breach, Mr Straw referred to operative
paragraph 4 of the resolution, but went on to say:
“As with any definition of that type, it is never possible to give an exhaustive list of all
the conceivable behaviours that it covers. That judgement has to be made against
the real circumstances that arise, but I reassure the House that material breach
means something significant: some behaviour or pattern of behaviour that is serious.
Among such breaches could be action by the Government of Iraq seriously to
obstruct or impede the inspectors, to intimidate witnesses, or a pattern of behaviour
where any single action appears relatively minor but the actions as a whole add up
to something deliberate and more significant: something that shows Iraq’s intention
not to comply.”
157.  Mr Straw also stated that the resolution made clear that there were two parts
to a material breach, “a failure of disclosure and other failure to comply”.
158.  Addressing who would decide what happened if there was a material breach,
Mr Straw stated that if there were “any further material breach”, it would be reported
to the Security Council “for assessment” and the Council would convene immediately
to “consider the situation and the need for full compliance with all the relevant …
resolutions in order to secure international peace and security”.
159.  Mr Straw added:
“If there is evidence of a false statement or omission, together with a failure to
comply in other respects, it can be reported to the Security Council as a further
material breach either by a Security Council member or by the inspectors.
The Council will undoubtedly require the opinion of the inspectors, regardless
of who makes the final report.
“There is then a clear requirement for an immediate meeting of the Security Council
to make the assessment … Where the breach is flagrant – say, a physical and
serious attack on the inspectors the decision on whether there had been a material
breach will effectively have been made by the Iraqis … there will be no decision to
be made. The Security Council will undoubtedly then act …”
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