The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
582.
The JIC
assessed that a minority of Sunnis regarded suicide attacks on
Shia
targets as
justified. AQ-I was capitalising on the increasing sectarian
tensions, and was
claiming to
have assassinated 26 Badr members since the start of the year under
the
guise of
protecting the Sunni community.
583.
On 25
February, the British Embassy Baghdad reported to the FCO on
the
aftermath
of the al-Askari bombing.284
Mr Patey
summarised the situation as:
“Iraqi
politicians begin to pull together. Agreement to a first meeting of
the
broadly‑based
National Advisory Committee this evening, 25 February.
Khalilzad
and
I will attend. Level of violence now significantly lower with
imposition of curfew
helping to
reduce number of incidents. 119 confirmed civilian deaths in total
to date.
But
situation remains fragile and vulnerable to a terrorist
spectacular.”
584.
Mr Patey
also reported a “well-received” press conference by Prime
Minister
Ja’afari,
“in which he highlighted that those behind the recent violence were
using
sectarian
tensions to provoke a civil war in the country”. He had announced
the
deployment
of armed forces to the most affected areas and special measures to
protect
places of
worship across Iraq. Unconfirmed figures suggested that 51 mosques
had
been
attacked in a wave of violence following the al-Askari
bombing.
585.
Sir Nigel
Sheinwald continued his efforts to reach out to those close to the
Sunni
insurgency
with another round of talks in mid-February.285
586.
The following
week he wrote to Mr Hadley explaining that the aim of the
talks was
to maintain
the dialogue and to expand the group, an aim he had
achieved.
587.
In particular,
Sir Nigel had wanted to persuade his interlocutors to stick
with
the
political process despite its frustrations and their concerns over
Iran and rising
sectarianism.
With the exception of the Ba’athists, all those with whom he spoke
had
reiterated
their commitment to the political process and promised to use their
influence
with the
insurgents.
588.
Dr Howells
told DOP(I) on 2 March that, although it had been hoped that
the
al‑Askari
bombing would have “a positive catalytic effect on Iraqi
politicians, and push
them toward
the early formation of a unity government”, unfortunately that did
not
appear to
be happening and the security situation remained
“tense”.286
Further
delay was
possible in
the formation of a government.
284
eGram
3932/06 Baghdad to FCO London, 25 February 2006, ‘Iraq: Al-Askariya
Aftermath’.
285
Letter
Sheinwald to Hadley, 28 February 2006, ‘Meetings with Iraqi
Sunnis’.
286
Minutes, 2
March 2006, DOP(I) meeting.
586