4.3 |
Iraq WMD assessments, October 2002 to March 2003
372.
Sir John told
the Inquiry that the briefing for Cabinet members was
designed
to cover:
“… the
current assessment of CBW capabilities and delivery systems; the
reaction
on the
regime’s part to the prospect of military action, and their
behaviour and
reaction to
the presence of inspectors; the response to 1441 and the
Assessment
we made of
the declaration in December; the activity on the concealment side;
the
problem
with interviews of scientists and so on; Saddam’s military options,
including
for the use
of CBW; the aspects relating to international terrorism; the impact
on the
terrorist
threat internationally, but also there was mention of what the
Assessments
were saying
about the presence of extremists inside Iraq at the
time.”141
373.
Asked if any
of the briefing included material that was not included in
current
JIC Assessments,
Sir John replied:
“No, I was
sticking to the regular briefing that was being
given.”
374.
Lord Turnbull,
Cabinet Secretary from September 2002 to September
2005,
told the
Inquiry that he thought the briefings for members of Cabinet in
February
had
influenced their perspective.142
He stated:
“they were all very conditioned by the
intelligence
presentation”.
375.
A full list of
the Iraq briefings provided by Mr Scarlett to Cabinet and
senior
Parliamentarians
was published by the ISC in September 2003.143
376.
The JIC
judged on 19 February that southern Iraq was “the most likely
area
for the
first use of CBW against both Coalition Forces and the local
population”.
377.
In its
discussion of the draft JIC Assessment of 19 February 2003, the
JIC
concluded
that Saddam Hussein was “likely to use CBW first in southern Iraq,
if
anywhere”.144
The
implications needed further discussion, in the final Assessment,
“to
bring out
the scale of the potential humanitarian crisis”, which would, in
the initial period,
need to be
dealt with by Coalition troops.
378.
The relevant
Key Judgement stated:
“Southern
Iraq is the most likely area for the first use of CBW against both
Coalition
Forces and
the local population.”
141
Private
hearing, 5 May 2010, pages 81-82.
142
Public
hearing, 13 January 2010, page 60.
143
Intelligence
and Security Committee, Iraqi
Weapons of Mass Destruction – Intelligence and
Assessments,
September 2003, Cm5972, paragraph 143.
144
Minutes, 19
February 2003, JIC meeting.
359