The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
140.
Mr Blair
added: “A lot of the work has already been done, there needs to be
some
more work
and some more checking” but “the best thing to do is to publish …
within the
next few
weeks”. When that happened:
“… people
will see that there is no doubt at all the United Nations
resolutions that
Saddam is
in breach of are there for a purpose. He [Saddam Hussein] is
without any
question,
still trying to develop that chemical, biological, potentially
nuclear capability
and to
allow him to do so without any let or hindrance, just to say, we
[sic] can carry
on and do
it, I think would be irresponsible.”
141.
In terms of
the specifics of Iraq’s WMD, Mr Blair made a number
of
comments including:
•
“… there is
no doubt that at some point the Iraqi regime were trying to
develop
nuclear
weapons … I believe that there is evidence that they will acquire
nuclear
weapons
capability if they possibly can.”
•
“Now we
will provide what support we can for that, although of course
the
absence of
inspectors … means there is necessarily a limit. But I don’t
think
we should
be in any doubt about the nature of this regime, they will
acquire
whatever
weapons they possibly can.”
•
“Certainly
they were trying to obtain a nuclear weapons capability. I think
there
is some
evidence that they continued to do so.”
•
“… [W]e
don’t really know what is happening now, there are huge
amounts
of stocks
of chemical, biological weapons unaccounted for.”
•
“… [W]e
can’t be quite sure what is happening on the nuclear side … but on
the
biological
and chemical weapons side there is no doubt about it, there are
vast
stocks of
these weapons unaccounted for by the previous weapons
inspectors.”
•
“And in
addition there is real concern that there is ballistic missile
technology.”
142.
Mr Blair
suggested that the reason Iraq might not be letting inspections
take place
was because
“the last time the inspectors were in there, they uncovered so much
that
the Iraqi
regime was deeply embarrassed”. He also argued that people would
“think
about it
differently once they see the evidence”.
143.
Mr Campbell
wrote in his diary on 3 September:
“The
hardest [question] was: ‘Why now? What was it that we knew now that
we
didn’t
before that made us believe we had to do it now?’ It was not going
to be
at all easy
to sell the policy in the next few months …”59
59
Campbell A
& Hagerty B. The
Alastair Campbell Diaries. Volume 4. The Burden of Power:
Countdown
to Iraq.
Hutchinson,
2012.
140