9.5 |
June 2006 to 27 June 2007
•
Security.
The plan assumed that the revised US plan was likely to see a
move
by
coalition forces out of urban areas into consolidated bases on the
outskirts
of urban
areas and accelerated transition to Iraqi control based on “a
more
pragmatic
and subjective Iraq‑led approach” to assessing suitability for PIC
to
replace the
“current mechanistic and convoluted assessment process”.
The
plan said:
“This may mean that the conditions for transfer are relaxed
thus
accelerating
the process of transition. The risk is that a less rigorous
process
may
increase the chances of subsequent under performance by the Iraqis.
In
practice,
it places an increasing emphasis on the capability of the Iraqi
Security
Forces
rather than the security situation on the ground, closely supported
by
efforts on
the governance and economic front. We may, however, face a
degree
of pushback
in the detailed execution of our plan from the US, despite
prior
agreement
in principle.”
308.
Responding to
Mr McDonald, Mr Blair’s Private Secretary reported that
he had
described
the Forward Plan as “an excellent piece of work”.169
The Private
Secretary
asked for
the Plan to be finalised and implemented; the section on reforming
key
Ministries
needed more detail and there was nothing yet on strategic
communications.
The Plan
itself would require a high-profile launch.
309.
On 25
November, Mr Blair mentioned the draft Forward Plan to
President Bush
during a
telephone conversation and offered to send him a
copy.170
They
discussed
whether
100,000 more troops, as proposed by some in the US, would not work
and the
importance
of demonstrating that the coalition was taking the initiative in
the next phase.
310.
Mr Blair
commented on the differences between the situation in Baghdad and
in
Basra,
where Op SINBAD appeared to have gone well. He suggested that it
should be
possible
for Basra to be controlled by the Iraqis, “with our
support”.
311.
No.10 sent the
White House a copy of the Forward Plan later that day,
stressing
that it
remained “work in progress”.171
312.
On 29
November, VAdm Style told the Chiefs of Staff that the Forward Plan
had
received
Mr Blair’s approval over the weekend.172
He also
described “the need for
caution
regarding supportive statements about ‘accelerated transition’ by
US military
interlocutors”.
313.
Lt Gen
Houghton updated the Chiefs of Staff on efforts to counter the
threat of
indirect
fire in Basra. In discussion, the Chiefs of Staff noted “the
potential opportunity
afforded by
planned force withdrawals from Basra … to leverage local deals to
reduce
the IDF
threat”.
169
Letter
Banner to McDonald, 27 November 2006, ‘Iraq: Forward
Plan’.
170
Letter
Banner to Hayes, 25 November 2006, ‘Prime Minister’s VTC with
President Bush, 25 November’.
171
Letter
Sheinwald to Hadley, 25 November 2006, untitled, attaching Note
Blair, 27 November 2006, ‘Iraq
Forward
Plan and Paper, undated, ‘Iraq: Forward Plan’.
172
Minutes, 29
November 2006, Chiefs of Staff meeting.
59