The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
317.
Whilst British
forces were in Iraq under a UN mandate, Mr Blair warned that
“There
is no
justification for Iran or any other country interfering in Iraq
…”
318.
On 10 October,
Dr Reid told Parliament that in November 2005 the UK
would
be reducing
the number of its troops in Iraq from approximately 8,500 to
8,000.144
He
explained
that: “The United Kingdom is in Iraq for as long as we are needed
and as long
as we need
to be there, and no longer.”
319.
Dr Reid
described the situation in Basra as “largely calm” after the
Jameat
incident,
which he characterised as “an extremely complex operation in
defence of
our own soldiers”.
320.
The change in
the number of UK troops in Iraq reflected:
“… the
closure of two small bases in Basra, the transfer of some training
tasks to the
Iraqi
security forces and structural differences between the two
brigades. These are
relatively
minor adjustments, however, and will not affect activities being
carried out
by United
Kingdom forces.”
321.
In October
2005, the Joint Committee to Transfer Security Responsibility
(JCTSR)
produced
‘Conditions for Provincial Transfer’, which set the framework for
the MNF-I to
transfer
security responsibility to an Iraqi civilian
authority.145
The
document set out a
series of
standards in four areas:
•
the
insurgency threat;
•
ISF
capability;
•
governance
capacity; and
•
residual
support from coalition forces.
322.
For a province
to be deemed ready for transfer to Iraqi control, the document
said
that the
MNF-I, the Iraqi Ministries of Interior and Defence and the
National Intelligence
Co-ordination
Council would all need to have assessed the terrorist/insurgent
threat
level
(including external border security) in that province as “low” and
either forecast
it as
“steady or on a downward trend”. The IPS’s crime assessment and the
presence
of armed
groups must not materially change these assessments. Threats to
critical
infrastructure
and communications should also be assessed as low, and a
programme
for handing
in unauthorised weapons should be in place.
323.
The standards
set out for the IPS included that they should be assessed
by
the MOI and
the MNF-I to have the capacity to maintain domestic order, to
prevent
a
resurgence of terrorism, and to co-ordinate counter-insurgency
(COIN) operations
144
House of
Commons, Official
Report, 10
October 2005, columns 24-27.
145
International
Mandate Republic of Iraq National Security Council, 10 October
2005, ‘Joint Committee to
Transfer
Security Responsibility’.
542