The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
938.
On 17
September, UK forces detained two leading members of a JAM
splinter
group.885
On 19
September, two UK soldiers were arrested by the IPS in Basra
and
taken to
the Jameat Police Station. Negotiations to release the soldiers
failed, and a
rescue was
mounted by MND(SE). That became known as ‘the Jameat incident’ and
is
described
in detail in the Box below.
On 19
September, two UK soldiers were arrested by the
IPS.886
According
to the account
provided to
No.10 by Dr Reid’s office, the two soldiers had been working
under cover
following
up the operation against JAM the previous weekend. They had been
parked
at the side
of a road when an unmarked vehicle with four men in plain clothes
pulled up
behind
them. Two people got out of the car and walked towards the
soldiers’ vehicle, with
weapons
cocked. The UK soldiers, believing they were “facing death or
serious injury”,
opened fire
killing one of the men and wounding the other. Not realising the
men they had
shot were
police, the soldiers tried to escape but were blocked by police in
several marked
vehicles
who opened fire. At that point, the two soldiers put down their
weapons and
produced
their identification.
Although
the uniformed police initially appeared willing to talk
constructively with the
soldiers,
“the atmosphere changed significantly” when Iraqi police arrived in
plain clothes.
The two UK
soldiers were reported to have been beaten and then taken to the
Jameat
Police
Station, which was known to MND(SE) as a “notorious detention
facility” and
home of the
Serious Crimes Unit (SCU), “which had been infiltrated by militant
elements,
especially
the Jaysh al Mahdi and (by his own admission) were outside the
control of the
Chief of
Police”.
Negotiations
to hand over the arrested soldiers to MNF, in line with agreed
practice where
MNF
personnel were arrested by ISF, failed and the negotiators
themselves were unable
to leave
the Jameat Police Station. The Governor and Chief of Police had
made it clear
that they
were not in a position to offer any assistance and, despite
explicit directions by
the Chief
of Police to release the two soldiers, the IPS refused to comply.
Orders from the
MOI in
Baghdad were similarly disregarded. The General commanding the 10th
Division
of the
Iraqi Army also “refused to get involved in the
incident”.
A rescue
operation was successfully mounted by MND(SE) using armed force to
free the
six
negotiators and the two soldiers. That was achieved without
casualties on either side
but caused
significant damage to the wall of the police station and several
police vehicles.
The two
soldiers who had originally been arrested were found to have been
taken to a
house away
from the police station and held by what was suspected to be a
mixture of
JAM and IPS
personnel. A further rescue operation was carried out successfully
(again
without
casualties) to free them later that evening.
885
Letter
Naworynsky to Quarrey, 23 September 2005, ‘Iraq Update’ attaching
COS MND(SE), ‘GOC
MND(SE) –
Southern Iraq Update – 21 September’.
886
Letter
Naworynsky to Quarrey, 23 September 2005, ‘Iraq Update’ attaching
COS MND(SE), ‘GOC
MND(SE) –
Southern Iraq Update – 21 September’.
270