The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
•
Iraq’s
acquisition and expenditure of munitions before 1988 could not
be
verified
because of the absence of sufficient evidence from Iraq and its
former
foreign
suppliers of the procurement of precursor chemicals, production
and
weaponisation
of CW agents.
•
In trying
to determine a material balance of the munitions which had existed
in
1991,
UNSCOM had been unable to account for some 16,000 unfilled
munitions
and 550
munitions filled with mustard, primarily because of Iraq’s
unilateral
destruction
programme.
•
There was
also a “material balance” of around 4,000 tons of key
precursor
chemicals.
•
Almost all of
Iraq’s production equipment had been destroyed in the
1991
conflict
or subsequently under UN supervision.
332.
Iraq’s
biological weapons programme was, however, an area which was
“unredeemed
by progress
or any approximation of the known facts of Iraq’s programme”. There
was
“incomprehension”
about Iraq’s persistence in “refusing to make the facts known” and
why
it was “so
insistent on blocking the Commission’s own efforts to reach those
facts”.
333.
A panel of
experts drawn from 13 Member States of the Security Council
had
unanimously
concluded that Iraq’s latest FFCD was “not acceptable”. The
declaration
was
“incomplete”, had “significant inaccuracies”, and the outstanding
problems with all
aspects of
proscribed activity were “numerous and grave”. There were no
insights into
the
decisions to commence the biological weapons programme, or to
conceal it between
1991 and
1995.
334.
In September,
Mr Butler and Mr Aziz had agreed that the new FFCD on
biological
weapons,
and all other FFCDs in UNSCOM’s possession, should be regarded as
final;
and that
the Commission would not further assist Iraq in the formulation of
its account.
335.
The report
also stated that:
•
Much
greater resources could be required in the future to monitor and
verify
dual‑capable
facilities and the export and import of dual-capable
items.
•
The
monitoring system could not be comprehensive until the Security
Council
had been
“able to conclude that Iraq’s prohibited programmes have
been
destroyed,
removed or rendered harmless” and the “full extent” of
Iraq’s
prohibited
programmes was known.
•
The Iraqi
Government’s stated willingness to comply fully with the
requirements
for
monitoring had “not always been reflected, in practice, on the
ground”. While
the number
of incidents of concealment, deception and interference with
the
inspections
process were “relatively small”, they served to “reduce confidence
in
Iraq’s
commitment to the system”.
•
There was
still “considerable uncertainty” about Iraq’s retention of
prohibited
material
and concealment systems.
82