3.2 |
Development of UK strategy and options, January to April 2002 –
“axis of evil” to Crawford
425.
In the main
text, but not in the Key Judgements, the Assessment warned
that
the
intelligence on Iraq’s WMD and ballistic missile programmes was
“sporadic
and
patchy”. It
added , however, that Iraq was:
“… well
practised in the art of deception, such as concealment and
exaggeration.
A complete
picture of the various programmes is therefore difficult. But it is
clear
that Iraq
continues to pursue a policy of acquiring WMD and their delivery
means.
Intelligence
indicates that planning to reconstitute some of its programmes
began
in 1995.
WMD programmes were then given a further boost with the withdrawal
of
UNSCOM
inspectors.”
426.
The Assessment
and the uncertainties underlying its judgements are
addressed
in more
detail in Section 4.1.
427.
Mr Blair
concluded that the papers he had been given on Iraq did
not
constitute
a properly worked out strategy and that he would need to provide
the
US with a
far more intelligent and detailed analysis of a game
plan.
428.
Mr Blair
asked for a meeting with military personnel. He did not seek
a
collective
discussion with Mr Straw, Mr Hoon and other key Cabinet
colleagues.
429.
Mr Blair sent
a minute on 17 March to Mr Powell, and a copy to Sir David
Manning,
setting out
three points in response to the briefing papers he had been given
for the
meeting
with President Bush:
“(1) In all
my papers I do not have a proper worked-out strategy on how we
would
do it. The
US do not either, but before I go [to Crawford], I need to be able
to
provide
them with a far more intelligent and detailed analysis of a game
plan.
I will
need a meeting on this with military folk.
“(2) The
persuasion job on this seems very tough. My own side are
worried.
Public
opinion is fragile. International opinion – as I found at the EU –
is pretty
sceptical.
“Yet from a
centre-left perspective, the case should be obvious.
Saddam’s
regime is a
brutal, oppressive military dictatorship. He kills his
opponents,
has wrecked
his country’s economy and is source of instability and
danger
in the
region. I can understand a right-wing Tory opposed to
“nation-building”
being
opposed to it on the grounds it hasn’t direct bearing on our
national
interest.
But in fact a political philosophy that does care about other
nations –
eg Kosovo, Afghanistan,
Sierra Leone – and is prepared to change regimes on
their
merits, should be gung-ho on Saddam. So why isn’t it? Because
people
believe we
are only doing it to support the US; and they are only doing it
to
settle an
old score. And the immediate WMD problems don’t seem
obviously
worse than
3 years ago.
463