The Report of the Iraq Inquiry

574. Mr Straw wrote to Mr Blair on 17 January, flagging up three major issues: targeting;

the response to any Iraqi use of WMD; and the need for greater clarity on thinking and

plans for the aftermath.189

575. Sir David Manning commented to Mr Blair: “Good questions. But I don’t think they

affect your decision in principle.”190

576. Mr Blair replied: “agreed”.191

577. Late on 17 January, following a telephone conversation, Sir David replied

to Mr Watkins that Mr Blair was “content to proceed on the basis of the Defence

Secretary’s recommendations” and that he would be grateful “if you and the FCO would

now take things forward as proposed”.192

578. Mr Hoon announced the deployment of UK ground forces, which would “include

the headquarters of 1 (UK) Armoured Division with support from 7 Armoured Brigade,

16 Air Assault Brigade and 102 Logistics Brigade”, in an oral statement in Parliament

on 20 January.193

579. Asked whether Cabinet on 16 January might have been an opportunity for some

of the points from the MOD briefing on military options to be mentioned, Lord Turnbull

told the Inquiry that Mr Blair was:

“… very reluctant to discuss the military options …

“I could see he didn’t want key discussions of where we were going, through the

North or the South and who was going to bring what forces to bear where, and

there is some sense in that. But the strategic choices that they implied … didn’t get

discussed either. For example, the fact that if you have ground forces you become

an Occupying Power. I don’t remember someone saying ‘Wouldn’t it be better if we

just halted at Option 2, because then we will not be involved in being an Occupying

Power?’ ...”194

580. Lord Turnbull subsequently added that Cabinet was given “Week by week progress

reports on the state of play of the inspections … That’s the bit they were actually rather

well‑informed about, much more so than on the military side.”195

581. The absence of a collective discussion on the implications of the military

deployment is addressed in Section 7.

189 Minute Straw to Prime Minister, 17 January 2003, ‘Iraq: UK Land Contribution’.

190 Manuscript comment Manning, 17 January 2002, on Minute Straw to Prime Minister, 17 January 2003,

‘Iraq: UK Land Contribution’.

191 Manuscript comment Blair, on Minute Straw to Prime Minister, 17 January 2003, ‘Iraq: UK Land

Contribution’.

192 Letter Manning to Watkins, 17 January 2003, ‘Iraq: UK Land Contribution’.

193 House of Commons, Official Report, 20 January 2003, columns 34‑46.

194 Public hearing, 25 January 2011, pages 15‑16.

195 Public hearing, 25 January 2011, page 17.

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