10.3 |
Reconstruction: oil, commercial interests, debt relief, asylum and
stabilisation policy
96.
Mr Geoff
Hoon, the Defence Secretary, sent Mr Blair formal advice on
the UK
contribution
to land operations in Iraq on 16 January.48
Mr Hoon
stated that the US
had asked
the UK to provide a ground force to take on a key role in southern
Iraq.
He described
the proposed UK Area of Responsibility in the south as “a coherent
one”,
which
included:
“… economic
infrastructure critical to Iraq’s future, including much of its oil
reserves,
critical
communications nodes, a city (Basra) of 1.3 million people and a
port (Umm
Qasr) about
the size of Southampton. Although the establishment of UK control
over
this area
will require careful presentation to rebut any allegations of
selfish motives,
we will be
playing a vital role in shaping a better future for Iraq and its
people.”
97.
Mr Straw
wrote to Mr Blair the following day in response to
Mr Hoon’s letter, setting
out three
concerns, including:
“… much
greater clarity is required about US thinking and plans for the
aftermath
… We need
in particular far greater clarity on US thinking on management of
the
98.
Mr Hoon’s
recommendations were endorsed by Mr Blair on 17
January,50
and
the
deployment
of a UK land package was announced to Parliament on 20
January.51
99.
Mr Peter
Ricketts, FCO Political Director, visited Washington on 13
January.52
100.
At the first
FCO Iraq Morning Meeting after his return from Washington,
Mr Ricketts
reported
that:
“… the US
show no sign of accepting our arguments on transitional
administrations.
They are
wedded to the idea of a prolonged US Occupation, and opposed to
any
substantial
role for the UN. We are likely to find the 22 January day after
talks hard
going in
this respect.”53
101.
Mr Chaplin
led the UK delegation to Washington for a second round of talks
on
post-conflict
planning with a US inter-agency team and an Australian delegation
on
22 January.
102.
Mr Dominick
Chilcott, FCO Middle East Department, sent an “Annotated
Agenda/
overarching
paper” for the meeting to Mr Straw on 17
January.54
The paper
listed a large
48
Letter Hoon
to Blair, 16 January 2003, ‘Iraq: UK Land
Contribution’.
49
Minute
Straw to Prime Minister, 17 January 2003, ‘Iraq: UK Land
Contribution’.
50
Letter
Manning to Watkins, 17 January 2003, ‘Iraq: UK Land
Contribution’.
51
House of
Commons, Official
Report, 20
January 2003, column 34.
52
Minute
Ricketts to Private Secretary [FCO], 14 January 2003, ‘Iraq: The
Mood in Washington’.
53
Minute
Tanfield to PS/PUS [FCO], 15 January 2003, ‘Iraq Morning Meeting:
Key Points’.
54
Minute
Chilcott to Private Secretary [FCO] and Chaplin, 17 January 2003,
‘Iraq: Day-After Issues’.
389