The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
127.
The JIC’s Key
Judgements included:
•
The attacks
had “set a new benchmark for terrorist atrocity. The level
of
destruction
and the public impact are unprecedented.”
•
“Terrorists
seeking comparable impact may try to use chemical,
biological
radiological
or nuclear devices …”
•
The
“potential scope for terrorist attacks” was “very wide”: “But in
order to
assess the
threat to the UK, we need to consider both the capabilities and
the
intentions
of the terrorist groups.”
•
“Only
Islamic extremists such as those who shared Usama Bin Laden’s
agenda
currently
have the motivation to pursue” attacks “with the deliberate aim
of
causing
maximum casualties”. The more closely the UK was identified with
the
US, “the
higher the potential threat” to UK interests “both here and
overseas”.
•
Major
attacks like those of 9/11 required considerable planning and
were
“therefore
likely to remain relatively infrequent”.
128.
Addressing the
nature of international terrorist groups, the JIC
stated:
“The word
‘groups’ can be misleading in the context of Islamic
extremist terrorists.
There are
established groups in different countries, usually working to a
national
agenda, but
the networks associated with UBL are changeable ad hoc
groupings
of individuals
who share his agenda, and who may come together only for
a
particular
operation.”
129.
The Assessment
stated that it was “not yet clear” whether the success of the
9/11
attacks
would:
“… alter
how international terrorist groups view the context in which they
operate.
But it has
certainly changed the psychological landscape. What had
seemed
a remote
possibility has become a fact … Copycat attacks could follow.
Some
terrorists
might feel driven to match or exceed the scale of casualties in
order
to achieve
a comparable impact. Or they might seek the same sort of shock,
for
example by
using chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear devices. On
the
other hand,
the sheer horror of the destruction could lead to a backlash
against
wanton
attacks by those who have previously supported terrorists. And if
the US
successfully
mobilises a new coalition of allies to end … UBL’s career, some
groups,
and
especially supportive states, might be deterred. But it will be
some time before
intelligence
is able to build up a picture of the actual effect of the 11
September
attacks
…”
130.
Conventional
munitions or Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs), “now
including
hijacked
aircraft”, were “the most likely form of attack”. But there was a
need to take into
account the
“following potential threats”:
38