9.6 |
27 June 2007 to April 2008
1029.
Mr Prentice
reported that at the 20 April meeting of MCNS, Gen
Petraeus
praised the
significant progress that the ISF had made in Basra in recent
weeks.508
The challenge,
Gen Petraeus said, would be to sustain it. He advised that the
sustained
campaign
needed to secure lasting success meant that the ISF had to start
planning
future
troop rotations so that they could stay on the
offensive.
1030.
ACM Stirrup
spoke to Gen Petraeus by telephone on 21 April.509
They agreed
that
given the
recent events in Basra the enterprise in South-East Iraq “now
represented a
‘joint
endeavour’”. Whilst the UK was content to retain the lead in the
South-East for the
moment,
this would need to be addressed in the longer term.
1031.
ACM Stirrup
made clear that the UK had to remain within current
force
levels,
accepting that there would need to be some restructuring to meet
the new
circumstances
and that, “for political reasons”, the UK would need to deliver
some
further
force reductions by the end of the year. They agreed that Lt Gen
Houghton
should
discuss proposals in more detail with Gen Petraeus so that ACM
Stirrup could
give “some
early thoughts” to Mr Brown.
1032.
On the same
day, Lt Gen Cooper reported his own discussion with Gen
Petraeus,
who said
that he could accept a drop in UK combat force elements in return
for an
increase in
HQ staff capability. This reflected expected resource pressure that
the MNF
would face
when the Polish HQ in Multi-National Division (Centre-South)
withdrew
1033.
Lt Gen Cooper
reported that “the overall picture shows a return to pre-22
March
attack
levels (which were in turn similar to 2005 levels)”. A trio of AQ-I
attacks in Mosul,
Baquabah
and Ramadi were a significant cause, along with “the continued
constant
dribble” of
fatalities and injuries from JAM or Special Group attacks. Prime
Minister
Maliki’s
attention was turning to “a new expedition” in Mosul.
1034.
Lt Gen Cooper
awaited the outcome of Phase III in Basra, but indications
were
that the
JAM leadership had moved out of Hayaniyah. The key was to ensure
they could
not
return.
1035.
Phase IV of
the Charge of the Knights was launched on 24 April, in the
Five
Mile Market
area of Basra, focused on “isolation and clearance, providing the
security
required to
conduct a detailed search”.511
1036.
Maj Gen
White-Spunner reported indications that Maysan province was
becoming
a refuge
for JAM militants – both Special Groups and mainstream – driven out
of Basra
508
eGram
15509/08 Baghdad to FCO London, 21 April 2008, ‘Iraq: Ministerial
Council on National Security
(MCNS) 20
April 2008’.
509
Email
Poffley to DG Op Pol, 22 April 2008, ‘Petraeus Telecom with CDS: 21
Apr 08’.
510
Minute
Cooper to CDS, 21 April 2008, ‘SBMR-I’s Weekly Report (297) 21 Apr
08’.
511
Minute
White-Spunner to CJO, 24 April 2008, ‘GOC MND(SE) Weekly Letter –
24 April 2008’.
375