9.6 |
27 June 2007 to April 2008
301.
At the request
of the MOD and FCO, on 6 September the JIC assessed
progress
of the
Baghdad Security Plan (known in Arabic as Fardh al-Qanoon (FAQ))
which had
begun in
February, and its future prospects.144
302.
The JIC judged
that:
“I. Under
the current Baghdad Security Plan, intensified Multi-National Force
(MNF)
and Iraqi
security force (ISF) operations have improved security for Iraqis
in general
in Baghdad.
Civilian, ISF and MNF casualties have reduced. Attacks on the
MNF
have fallen
off since June, and are now at the lowest level since June
2006.”
303.
The JIC
assessed that MNF operations focused on the AQ-I threat and other
Sunni
Islamist
extremists had had an effect. The number of high-profile suicide
attacks against
Shia
targets had fallen.
304.
Outside
Baghdad, overall attack levels had fallen sharply after record
highs in
June. The
JIC assessed it was “too early to say whether this trend will be
sustained”.
305.
The JIC judged
that: “The Iraqis have taken no political advantage of the
improved
security to
pursue national reconciliation or reconstruction.”
“The Iraqi
Government committees established to deal with economic
regeneration
and
communal reconciliation have achieved little of substance.
Electricity and fuel
shortages
remain more acute in Baghdad than elsewhere in Iraq and are the
cause
of
widespread disillusionment, undermining the government’s
credibility.”
307.
In relation to
performance of the ISF, the JIC judged:
“The
initial higher level Iraqi management of and engagement with the
complexities
of FAQ was
encouraging. From the start, Maliki took a ‘hands on’ approach,
chairing
FAQ’s
Executive Steering Committee and co-ordinating security operations
… But
in recent
months his enthusiasm has worn off. Continuing high profile attacks
in
Baghdad
(together with Shia nervousness over programmes to support armed
Sunni
tribes)
have strained Maliki’s relations with senior MNF commanders. We
judge Iraqi
confidence,
both among Ministers and more generally, has been damaged by
the
popular
perception that security has not significantly
improved.”
308.
The JIC
considered that key Iraqi structures established to manage FAQ were
still
“overwhelmingly
Shia”. The government had taken some steps to address human
rights
abuses,
including sacking 23 senior National Police commanders and
disbanding an
entire
battalion accused of complicity in sectarian acts. But other
individuals accused of
sectarian
abuses remained in positions of responsibility.
144
JIC
Assessment, 6 September 2007, ‘Baghdad Security Plan: Impact and
Prognosis’.
239