The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
departmental
scrutiny to determine the concurrent requirement to resource
both
theatres
and define how our national aviation resources should be
realigned.”33
74.
Mr Browne and
Lord Drayson intervened in August 2006. Lord Drayson told
the
Inquiry
that he had asked Mr Browne to authorise him “to explore whether
helicopters
could be
found quickly and to worry about how they would be funded after we
had
identified
a possible solution”.34
75.
An exchange
between Mr Browne and General Sir Timothy
Granville‑Chapman,
Vice Chief
of the Defence Staff, on 7 September illustrated how Ministers
injected
urgency
into addressing equipment shortfalls. When Gen Granville‑Chapman
suggested
that
options to add capability would be considered in October, Mr Browne
responded:
“No: it should
happen tomorrow!”35
76.
That prompted
a review of what short‑term relief could be offered to
improve
helicopter
availability. In December 2007, Mr Browne wrote that helicopter
support
to Iraq was
“generally assessed as satisfactory”36
and that
the priority was therefore
Afghanistan.
The Inquiry has not seen any evidence to suggest that that
assessment
was
reconsidered for the remainder of Op TELIC.
77.
In deciding to
undertake concurrent operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, the
UK
knowingly
exceeded the Defence Planning Assumptions. All resources from that
point
onwards
were going to be stretched. Any decision which commits the UK to
extended
operations
in excess of the Defence Planning Assumptions should be based on
the most
rigorous
analysis of its potential implications, including for the
availability of relevant
capabilities
for UK forces.
78.
At the start
of Op TELIC, the MOD knew that it had capability gaps in
relation
to
protected mobility and ISTAR and that either could have a
significant impact on
operations.
Known gaps in such capabilities should always be clearly
communicated
to Ministers.
79.
The MOD should
be pro‑active in seeking to understand and articulate new
or
additional
equipment requirements. The MOD told the Inquiry that there was no
simple
answer to
the question of where the primary responsibility for identifying
capability gaps
lay during
Op TELIC. That is unacceptable. The roles and responsibilities for
identifying
and
articulating capability gaps in enduring operations must be clearly
defined,
communicated
and understood by those concerned. It is possible that this has
been
addressed
after the period covered by this Inquiry.
33
Minute
Houghton to MA/VCDS, 12 June 2006, ‘Quantifying Battlefield
Helicopter (BH) Requirements
on Operations’.
34
Statement,
15 December 2010, page 8.
35
Manuscript
comment Browne on Minute VCDS
to SofS, 7 September 2006, ‘Helicopter Capability’.
36
Letter
Browne to Brown, 6 December 2007, ‘Update for the Prime Minister on
Helicopter Issues’.
240