9.3 |
July 2004 to May 2005
“The
immediate outcome in Fallujah has boosted the authority of the
IIG.
But in the
longer-term substantial Sunni participation in the election remains
vital.
If a
significant number of Sunni Arabs fail to vote, the elections will
at best lack
international
credibility and at worst could be destabilising.”
374.
The JIC
reviewed Iranian support for insurgents within Iraq on 9
December.198
It judged:
“Iran’s
Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) remains intent on
supporting
anti-coalition
resistance in Iraq …
“We have no
firm evidence linking Iran to specific insurgent attacks since
August,
but
intelligence suggests activity in support of potential attacks
continues.
Supreme Leader
Khamenei probably continues to provide tacit support for
this.
“Iran will
persist with a twin track approach, supporting the holding of
elections in
January,
while providing limited backing to Shia militants. But with the
Najaf crisis
having
subsided and elections on track, Iranian support for Shia militants
may
continue at
a lower level in the short term. There is no intelligence to show
current
Iranian
support to Sunni insurgents.
“Iran would
be likely to ratchet up its support to Shia militants in the event
of any
renewed
confrontation between Shia elements and the coalition. It would
also back
the Shia in
the face of growing sectarian violence.
“A
constraint on the Iranians will remain their concern at the threat
of US military
action
against them. In consequence, while Iran will be tempted to take
advantage
of any
opportunity to support new attacks in Iraq in order to make life
difficult for the
coalition,
any significant escalation would depend on IRGC confidence in its
ability
to avoid
exposure of its role.”
375.
On 9 December,
Mr Straw’s Private Secretary sent a paper on handling Iraq
in
2005 to Mr
Blair’s Private Secretary.199
376.
The paper,
described as an agenda for discussion with the US,
recommended
maintaining
momentum in the political process, broadening international
consensus
on Iraq,
reaching early agreement on the future of the MNF-I and making
progress on
reconstruction
and economic reform.
377.
The FCO
considered that continued progress on Iraqiisation would allow the
MNF-I
to move
from primary responsibility for security in all areas to a
supportive role during
2005,
working either in support of ISF operationally or as trainers or
mentors. A transfer
of lead
responsibility for security to the ISF could occur in summer
2005.
198
JIC
Assessment, 9 December 2004, ‘Iraq: Iran’s Support for Insurgents –
Updated’.
199
Letter Owen
to Quarrey, 9 December 2004, ‘Iraq: 2005’ attaching Paper ‘Iraq:
2005: Forward Look’.
455