3.7 |
Development of UK strategy and options, 1 February to 7 March
2003
339.
Reporting on
his visit to the US, Mr Hoon told Cabinet that the US
Administration
“had a good
appreciation” of the Government’s political situation. In his view,
it would
be
“important politically” that any further resolution “should be
simple” and “provide
straightforward
legal justification for taking military action”; “obscurity or
justification
relying on
bureaucratic references back to earlier resolutions” should be
avoided.
340.
The points
made in discussion included:
•
the
authority of the UN “could be undermined both by a failure to act
and
by action
taken without its sanction”;
•
the tone of
public communications “should not give the impression of a
rush
to war:
there was a benefit in a distinctively British
approach”;
•
while
public opinion “did not seem persuaded of the necessity of
war,
it appeared
to support military action when combined with a
further
Security Council
resolution”;
•
emphasis
had to be given to the future welfare of the Iraqi people as
well
as the re-invigoration
of the MEPP;
•
work “had
started” in the US to “put in place structures for the
recovery
and reconstruction
of Iraq in the event of military conflict”.
341.
Summing up the
discussion, Mr Blair said that the Government “should
maintain
the
integrity” of the UN process. That “did not mean allowing Iraq to
prolong inspections
indefinitely”.
Iraq had:
“… been
given a final chance to comply and full co-operation was
required,
otherwise
the issue returned to the Security Council for discussion. There
was no
point in
conceding more time for inspections if the lack of co-operation did
not permit
the
inspectors to do their job.”
342.
Mr Blair
expected public opinion “to shift before we got to the point of
military
action.
Some polling showed that there would be support both in the event
of a further
Security
Council resolution and if the majority of the Security Council
supported action
despite a
veto”. Strenuous efforts were being made to avoid the alienation of
France and
Germany.
The UK would stand up for itself and had support in Europe. The
international
community
need to be engaged in dealing with the humanitarian consequences
of
Saddam
Hussein’s rule in Iraq. The “best course was to keep our nerve and
persevere”.
343.
Mr Campbell
wrote that Mr Cook had “really played up the extent of the
opposition”
on Iraq,
and that he might be “putting down a marker” about his departure:
“He was
clearly
very offside and had become more so.”94
94
Campbell A
& Hagerty B. The
Alastair Campbell Diaries. Volume 4. The Burden of Power:
Countdown
to Iraq.
Hutchinson,
2012.
239