6.5 | Planning and preparation for a post-Saddam Hussein Iraq, January to March 2003

1023. Sir David Manning had already consulted Sir Jeremy Greenstock on whether

Mr Blair should speak to Mr Annan.435 Sir David informed Mr Blair that Sir Jeremy felt

that “on balance” Mr Blair should speak to Mr Annan “to keep him in play”. Sir Jeremy

suggested explaining that, if the second resolution failed and conflict occurred:

“… we shall want to involve the UN as rapidly, and fully, as possible, once military

action is over. We are pressing for a real role for a UN Special Co-ordinator. One of

our principal concerns has been, and will remain, to try to safeguard the UN system.”

1024. Sir David commented to Mr Blair:

“Incidentally, this would play well with Clare [Short] who has sent me a message

saying how important she thinks it is that you are in close consultation with Kofi

[Annan] over Iraq.”

1025. Mr Blair spoke to Mr Annan on 16 March, before the start of the Azores Summit

(see Section 3.8).436 They discussed the importance of a strong UN role in post-conflict

Iraq, the need for a relationship between the UN and “whoever was occupying Iraq”,

and a resolution establishing the relationship between the occupying force and occupied

Iraq.

1026. At the Azores Summit, Mr Blair emphasised the presentational benefits of

UN involvement in post-conflict Iraq. He told President Bush and Mr José María

Aznar, the Prime Minister of Spain:

• it was necessary to give the impression that the administration of Iraq was

under UN authority, and the clearer the UN role the better; and

• the UN should be seen to give overall authorisation, but could certainly not

run everything.

1027. At the Azores Summit, Mr Blair, President Bush and Prime Minister Aznar

discussed the likelihood that the invasion would be welcomed, but the risk that there

would be communal violence. They also discussed the role the UN should play, including

that it would not be able to deal with communal violence.437 That would need to be

“handled rapidly by the military”.

1028. Mr Blair stated that the role of the UN in post-conflict Iraq must be defined very

carefully:

“We must give the impression that the administration was under UN authority.

The clearer the UN role, the better. It was vital that UK public opinion understood

that we were not taking possession of Iraq’s oil.”

435 Minute Manning to Prime Minister, 14 March 2003’, ‘Iraq: Contact with Kofi Annan’.

436 Letter Campbell to Owen, 16 March 2003, ‘Iraq: Kofi Annan, 16 March’.

437 Letter Manning to McDonald, 16 March 2003, ‘Iraq: Summit Meeting in the Azores: 16 March’.

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