The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
1004.
The UK’s
strategy had to be flexible enough to respond to the situation
on
the ground,
but there was a need for an urgent cross-government view on the
area
of Iraq for
which the UK might want to accept responsibility “in order to make
the
task of
scoping different scenarios possible”.
1005.
The Inquiry
has seen no indication that the urgent, cross-government
work
recommended
by the SPG took place.
1006.
Development
of the Government’s thinking on the location and extent
of
the UK
military Area of Responsibility (AOR) in Iraq is addressed in
Sections 6.1
and 6.2.
1007.
The
introduction to the “aftermath” section of the final, 13 December,
edition of
the SPG
paper on UK military strategic thinking pulled no
punches:
“The
aftermath (AM) phase of operations is likely to be the
strategically decisive
phase of
our engagement in Iraq. Only in this phase can our strategic
objectives be
met. It
will also form the lasting impression of Coalition legitimacy and
success.
“The
obvious deduction from this is that if we are not prepared to make
a
meaningful contribution
to the physical and political rehabilitation of Iraq in
the
AM phase
we should not be drawn into war-fighting. There is currently a
risk
that we view
our engagement in reverse, considering post-conflict activity as
a
necessary
but inconvenient adjunct to our war-fighting plans. The Winning
Concept
1008.
The material
in the aftermath section was described as “key deductions
distilled
from a
strategic estimate of the AM phase”. The stated aim was
to:
“a. Set out
a framework for the co-ordination of strategic planning
between
the MOD,
OGDs, other nations and, where feasible, NGOs.
b. Provide
guidance for PJHQ on the development of operational
plans.”
1009.
The paper
listed nine “key judgements”:
“The AM
phase will be the strategically decisive phase. We must be sure it
is
adequately
addressed in our consideration of the Winning Concept.
“No
overarching concept for the future of Iraq currently seems to
exist.
A framework
for the development of a new Iraqi state must be agreed
by
any Coalition
seeking to conduct military action that would result in
the
removal of
the current regime.
486
Paper
[SPG], 13 December 2002, ‘UK Military Strategic Thinking on
Iraq’.
282