The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
47.
Phase IV
planning was likely to be particularly important:
“… if, as
now appears likely, the UK were to take on the first Phase IV AOR
in
southern
Iraq. We would, in effect be setting the standard for the rest of
Phase IV
work. (And,
of course, CJO [Lt Gen Reith] is, in any case charged in CDS’
Directive12
with
planning humanitarian assistance in theatre should it become
necessary.)
“From our
point of view … we have to begin thinking very soon about the
practical
consequences
on the ground of taking on the AOR. These include issues
such
as: food,
water, displaced persons, oil (including accounting for its use),
potential
Iranian
incursions, pollution as well as, in the slightly longer term,
security sector
reform and
reconstruction. Some, if not all of this will of course either
determine, or
more
properly ought to be determined by, strategic considerations of
post-conflict
Iraqi structures.”
48.
Mr Flaherty
explained that PJHQ intended to establish a team charged
with
“developing
planning for Phase IV implementation” as soon as possible, which
would
aim to take
into account the lessons of the Balkans and Afghanistan. PJHQ
was
“in a
reasonably good position to link up with US military thinking”, but
would need
more
support from other government departments to help produce “a fully
joined
up approach”.
49.
The MOD
Strategic Planning Group (SPG) advised that forces
committed
to a
southern option in addition to the Amphibious Group would
demonstrate
a UK
commitment to all phases of an operation and, crucially, the
aftermath,
and provide
additional leverage in the planning phases.
50.
The UK
would gain a potential veto, but exercising it would strain
UK/US
relations.
51.
The role
envisaged, of stabilising the South as US forces moved north,
had
the
advantage of a reduction in the probable need for high intensity
war-fighting.
52.
The
analysis underpinning the SPG’s conclusions did not appear to
include
any
assessment of the conditions likely to be encountered or the tasks
to be
performed
in either northern or southern Iraq during Phase IV.
53.
On 7 January,
the SPG produced a paper analysing the advantages and
disadvantages
of changing to a southern option and the risks of a campaign
without
12 An
explanation of the Chief of Defence Staff’s Directive is provided
in Section 8.
13
Paper
[SPG], 7 January 2003, ‘Operation TELIC – Military Strategic
Analysis of Pros/Cons of Adopting
a Southern
Land Force Option’.
394