9.5 |
June 2006 to 27 June 2007
would
probably regard this as removing the need for tough MNF or ISF
action.
Sadr is
taking some action, but we doubt that he or many JAM leaders are
prepared
to disarm
in the current security climate.”
469.
If the Iraqi
Government did act, the JIC assessed:
“… any
perception that a full scale assault on JAM had begun or that Sadr
was
being
personally targeted would be most likely to provoke fierce
resistance. In such
circumstances,
violence would be likely across the southern provinces: in the
worst
case it
could reach levels similar to those during the Sadrist uprisings of
2004.”
470.
The JIC
concluded that the Iraqi Government’s “symbiotic relationship” with
the
militias
was a significant factor in Sunni disaffection and reluctance to
engage in the
national
reconciliation agenda. It judged that Prime Minister
Maliki:
“…
genuinely wants to reduce violence. He accepts that some limited
action against
JAM is
necessary. But despite recent assurances to the US and robust
public
comments,
he will not support the sort of sustained military campaign needed
to
remove
JAM’s ability to keep parts of Baghdad outside government
control.
“Maliki’s
overriding concern is the survival of the UIA and his government:
like other
Shia
politicians he has a deep‑rooted fear of a Ba’athist return. The
UIA remains
fragile and
its survival is dependent on Maliki’s ability to balance the
competing
interests
of the rival SCIRI and Sadrist heavyweights …
“We judge
that any other Shia politician in Maliki’s position … would face
similar
pressures
and behave in much the same way.”
471.
Mr Browne
wrote to Mr Blair on 24 January setting out his thinking about
plans
for future
force levels in Iraq.254
Mr Browne
intended to use his visit to Iraq the following
week to
confirm whether the plans were appropriate in scope and timing and
to address
reported US
concerns. He wrote:
“Re‑posturing
… reflects the growing capability of the ISF to take on a greater
role
ahead of a
formal announcement of PIC. It is happening across Iraq. For
example,
just last
week the Corps agreed that … [the Iraqi Army] would take the lead
in Mosul,
Iraq’s
third largest city …
“Of course
Basra is different …”
472.
In the US
Administration, Mr Browne reported that:
“Casey and
Khalilzad have recently expressed concerns both about the optics of
a
relocation
of the US Regional Office from Basra Palace and the risk of leaving
Basra
in hock to
Iranian backed elements. The fact is that the level of violence
remains
relatively
low – half that in Mosul, and a fraction of that in Baghdad and
most
254
Letter
Browne to Blair, 24 January 2007, ‘Next Steps on Force Levels in
Iraq’.
87