The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
•
Working on
a post‑Saddam Iraqi regime: “The conundrum is: if it is
merely
changing
Saddam for another military dictator, that hardly elicits support
from
the rest of
Iraq, especially the Shia majority, and is in any event, not in
line with
our
principles; on the other hand, if the whole nature of the regime
changes, the
Sunni
minority in power may be less tempted to fold and acquiesce in
Saddam’s
removal.
But there are ways through this.”
•
“[N]aturally”
getting “detailed working on the military plan necessary to
succeed”.
•
Developing
a “proper media strategy” including “real information about life
under
Saddam …
The moral case for regime change should be made.”
•
Addressing
the “whole issue of the Muslim world and its relations with the
West”.
216.
Mr Blair
wanted detailed work internally within the UK and with the US
and
suggested:
“A small
team under JS [Jack Straw] and DM [David Manning] should meet
and
coordinate.
“If I go to
the US in the next couple of weeks, the idea should be to agree
the
strategy
with GWB [President Bush], set it out at the TUC [Trades Union
Congress]
or shortly
after and then get going.”
217.
In his memoir
Mr Blair wrote that he had returned from holiday with his
“lines
clear”. He:
“… was
going to be very tough: we had to deal with Saddam; it was right to
do it; we
had to send
an unvarnished and plain message on WMD to the
world.72
218.
Mr Blair
was concerned about the effect that press speculation, that he
was
seeking to
influence the US, would have on President Bush.
219.
Initially
Mr Blair’s instinct was to reiterate the lines he had been
using earlier
in the
year, but he quickly decided to use a press conference on 3
September to
set out a
public script on Iraq.
220.
Mr Campbell
wrote to Mr Blair on 30 August to warn him that during the
flight
to a
Sustainable Development Summit in Johannesburg the following day,
the press
would be
pushing him on Iraq.73
Mr Campbell
recommended a statement with the top
line
message that inaction was not an option, but which did not move the
line on the
question of
a decision on military action.
72
Blair
T. A
Journey.
Hutchinson, 2010.
73
Minute
Campbell to Prime Minister, 30 August 2002,
‘Iraq/Press’.
132