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The Report of the Iraq Inquiry
180.  In Sir Roderic’s view, the “only way we are now likely to get them [the Russians]
on board would be to drop the authorisation for war”. The Russians were “convinced that
the Americans are going to attack, come what may”.
181.  Sir David Manning put the email to Mr Blair on 11 March, commenting: “Good Rod
Lyne analysis on Putin/Iraq.”62
182.  Mr Blair spoke to President Putin who was ready to look for a way forward but
made it clear that Russia could not accept any proposition which looked like a “green
light for war”.63
183.  President Putin told Mr Blair that, following the visit to Baghdad by the Speaker of
the Russian Parliament, there were grounds to believe that Saddam Hussein understood
the necessity for disarmament, and had opted for the maximum co-operation with the
UN inspectors.
184.  President Putin also said that the Iraqis had been robust and confident and were
prepared to resist the Coalition; and that an initial military action might be over quickly
but Iraq was a big country and guerrilla warfare could continue for some time.
185.  Mr José Maria Aznar, the Spanish Prime Minister, told Mr Blair that he would
not favour putting the resolution to a vote without a guarantee of success.
186.  In a conversation with Mr Aznar, Mr Blair argued that the Spanish proposal for
a simple resolution needed to be combined with tests for Saddam Hussein.64
187.  Mr Aznar identified a number of concerns about the risks with the approach, but he
agreed to try. He was also reported to have said that without a guaranteed win, he would
not favour putting the resolution to a vote.
188.  Mr Blair also spoke to:
President Musharraf,65
Mr Silvio Berlusconi, the Italian Prime Minister,66 and
Mr Göran Persson, the Swedish Prime Minister,67
to seek support for his approach.
189.  Mr Blair warned Mr Annan that the US timeframe was “days not weeks” and it
was in “no mood to negotiate further”.
62  Manuscript comment Manning to PM, 11 March 2003, on Email Lyne to Ricketts, 10 March 2003,
‘Iraq/Russia’.
63  Letter Cannon to Owen, 11 March 2003, ‘Iraq: Prime Minister’s Conversation with Putin, 11 March’.
64  Letter Cannon to Owen, 11 March 2003, ‘Iraq: Prime Minister’s Conversation with Aznar, 11 March’.
65  Letter Cannon to Owen, 11 March 2003, ‘Iraq: Prime Minister’s Conversation with President of Pakistan,
11 March’.
66  Letter Rycroft to Owen, ‘Prime Minister’s Conversation with Berlusconi, 11 March’.
67  Letter Lloyd to Owen, 11 March 2003, ‘Iraq: Prime Minister’s Conversation with Persson’.
434
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