The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
IDF in
Basra amounted to “harassing fire” by theatre standards but it had
“assumed
strategic
significance following the events at Abu Naji599
and the
civilian drawdown from
Basra
Palace”.
1135.
Lt Gen Houghton
reported that accommodation now had “lateral”
protection
in place
but that overhead ballistic protection would not be complete until
the end of
June 2007
because of “a capacity issue”.
1136.
The ongoing
efforts to counter IDF included:
•
increased
patrolling;
•
ISTAR and
the use of attack helicopters;
•
the surging
of [UK theatre forces]; and
•
the
potential use of a US “Sense and Warn” system.
1137.
In discussion
the Chiefs of Staff noted:
“The long
term corrosive effect of IDF on coalition operations in Basra, and
the
difficulty
in quantifying the potential impact of counter IDF measures in the
near to
medium
term; the critical impact of the threat on the future civilian
force posture in
the city;
and the potential opportunity afforded by planned force withdrawals
from
Basra … to
leverage local deals to reduce the IDF threat.”
1138.
Lt Gen Houghton
was tasked with investigating options to improve the
procurement
timelines for fixed force protection in theatre.
1139.
Gen Granville‑Chapman
visited Iraq and Afghanistan from 27 November to
2 December
2006.600
One of the
points about Iraq highlighted in his visit report was:
“The
indirect fire threat needs urgent attention, not only to save life,
but also
because it
is probably a pre‑condition for PIC [Provincial Iraqi Control] and
an
essential
information operations issue if the opposition is not to claim it
has bombed
us out of
Basra … Action is in hand.”
1140.
Separately,
General Sir Redmond Watt, Commander in Chief Land, visited
Iraq
and the Al
Udeid air base in Qatar from 27 to 28 November.601
1141.
In Qatar, Air
Commodore Clive Bairsto, Air Officer Commanding 83
Expeditionary
Air Group,
told Gen Watt that he had “made the case” for more manned
airborne
surveillance,
particularly in Iraq where current and planned UAV deployments
were
“more
limited than Afghanistan”.
599
UK forces
handed over Camp Abu Naji in Maysan province to the Iraqi Security
Forces in August 2006
(see
Section 12.1). Before August, the camp had come under regular
rocket attacks from insurgents.
600
Minute VCDS
to CDS, 4 December 2006, ‘VCDS’s Visit to Afghanistan and Iraq 27
Nov – 2 Dec 06’.
601
Letter CINC
LAND to CGS, 6 December 2006, ‘Visit to Al Udeid and Basrah – 27‑28
November 2006’.
194