The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
97.
Following two
conversations with Dr Rice on 19 September, Sir David
Manning
recorded
that Mr Blair:
“… accepts
that we should bid high … with a view to being negotiated down to
the
sort of
resolution … we really want. He is content for us to work for
specific mention
of
disarmament in the resolution. He is also content for us to work
for a compromise
on the
question of an Iraqi declaration in parallel with preparations for
the inspectors’
return. He
is ready, too, to agree to a formulation that stipulates that
UNMOVIC’s
inspection
regime must be settled in consultation with the Security Council;
and
that we
should load this section of the resolution with demands on force
protection
for
regional bases, participation by the P5 etc., in the knowledge that
we shall have
to jettison
some of this under pressure from the Russians and French. He
has,
however,
confirmed that he is not willing to allow references to terrorism
to detract
from the
force of a resolution. This remains a firm UK red
line.”26
98.
In advance of
a planned visit to Moscow on 10 and 11 October, Mr Blair spoke
to
President
Putin on 19 September.27
99.
Mr Blair
said that the US decision to take the issue of Iraq to the UN was
a
significant
and welcome step, but in the light of Iraq’s letter of 16
September:
“… we must
hold to our original position: unconditional access for inspectors,
backed
by a strong
resolution. It was only under pressure that Saddam would move
further.
So we had
to keep the pressure up.”
100.
President
Putin had agreed that firm action was needed and that we must not
lose
time or
give Saddam Hussein a breathing space. As a result of pressure,
including from
Russia,
Saddam Hussein had yielded to an ultimatum. It would be wrong to
engage in
a debate
about a new resolution until we had seen how the inspectors got on.
President
Putin would
think further about what Mr Blair had said, and they had
agreed that it would
be vital to
keep together. There would be further discussions between
officials, including
a briefing
in London on Iraq’s WMD capability.
101.
The US
produced a draft resolution late on 20 September.
102.
Sir David
Manning told Dr Rice on 21 September that the draft was “very
difficult”
for the
UK.28
The risk
was that it would be interpreted as a pretext for very early
military
action and
the UK was:
“… not in
the business of manufacturing a casus belli. Only if we were seen
to
have tried
genuinely to make a success of the inspection route would we be
able to
secure
support for other action if Saddam blocked us.”
26
Letter
Manning to McDonald, 19 September 2002, ‘Iraq: Conversation with
Condi Rice’.
27
Letter
Rycroft to Sedwill, 19 September 2002, ‘Iraq: Prime Minister’s
Phone Call with Putin,
19 September’.
28
Letter
Manning to McDonald, 21 September 2002, ‘Iraq: Conversation with
Condi Rice’.
216