9.2 | 23
May 2003 to June 2004
170.
On 1 July, in
a letter to Sir Jeremy Greenstock, who would be
succeeding
Mr Sawers
as the Prime Minister’s Special Representative for Iraq,
Mr Peter Ricketts,
FCO
Political Director, wrote that he hoped the close consultation
between Mr Sawers
and
Ambassador Bremer could “be expanded to allow even greater access
to the
US machine
in Baghdad”.67
171.
Mr Ricketts
continued that “we need to keep working on establishing
mechanisms
for more
systematic US/UK consultation” and suggested that was a key
priority for
Sir
Jeremy’s first few weeks.
172.
The Joint
Intelligence Committee (JIC) reviewed the situation in Iraq on 2
July and
concluded
that:
“Numerous
groups and individuals, including extremists, are competing
for
influence
in post-war Iraq. A number of them have already demonstrated that
they
are
prepared to use violence to achieve their ends, and all have easy
access
to weapons.
“For most
Iraqis, the immediate concerns are security and living conditions.
Most
are, for
now, acquiescent in the Coalition presence. But events in Iraq will
depend
heavily on
Coalition action.
“Extremist
groups currently pose a direct threat to Coalition Forces, and
to
ordinary
Iraqis who work with the Coalition. For now, the activities of
these groups
are largely
unco-ordinated. However, it is likely that the links between groups
will
become
stronger.
“In the
medium to long term, disagreements over political, economic and
security
issues also
have the potential to escalate into conflict. Particular points of
friction are
likely to
include:
•
political
representation, and the future direction of Iraq;
•
access to
property, revenue and employment;
•
the
composition of the new national army and the future role of
militias.”68
173.
Sir John
Sawers told the Inquiry that:
“ … what we
were faced with increasingly through 2003 were a series of
challenges
to the
Coalition’s position that collectively represented an onslaught on
us. There
were the
remnants of the Ba’athist regime, the elements of the
presidential
guard, the
Fedayeen Saddam, all these specialist intelligence and security
units
that Saddam
set up, who had dissolved into the mainly Sunni areas and
were
reconstituting
and posing a terrorist threat to the Coalition. There was
Al-Qaida
linked
groups, who saw Iraq as an opportunity for them to continue their
global
67
Letter
Ricketts to Greenstock, 1 July 2003, ‘Iraq: UK Special
Representative’.
68
JIC
Assessment, 2 July 2003, ‘Iraq: Potential
Flashpoints’.
233