4.2  |  Iraq WMD assessments, July to September 2002

45.  The second document addressed several countries of concern.19 A two-page Annex

provided comments on Iraq.

46.  On Iraq’s nuclear weapons, the DIS stated that the intelligence on Iraq’s nuclear

weapons programme was “limited”. Saddam Hussein had held regular meetings with

Iraqi Atomic Energy personnel and expressed continuing support of atomic energy.

There was:

“No confirmed weapon-related facilities have been identified but some civil research

continues at Tuwaitha and rebuilding of Military Industrial Complex facilities

continues. Many scientists from the former nuclear weapons programme are known

to work at … al-Tahidi and may conduct nuclear-associated research. Any links

to a weapons programme have yet to be established.”

47.  On Iraq’s ballistic missiles systems, the DIS set out Iraq’s activities to develop short

range systems. On long-range missiles, it stated that Intelligence indicated Iraq had:

• a longer-range SCUD-derived missile “under development”. That was “probably

linked to the construction of a new large liquid propellant rocket engine static

test stand”;

• continued work on longer-range systems but it was “unlikely to produce such

new systems within five years if sanctions remained effective”; and

• “reported ambitions for missiles with ranges of 2,000 to 3,00km”.

48.  In addition, the DIS had “recently noted a world-wide drive to acquire production-

level quantities of materials for making solid rocket motors and a continued emphasis

on guidance and control technology”.

49.  On Iraq’s chemical and biological programmes the DIS stated:

• There had been “some refurbishment” of the former CW precursor production

facility near Habbaniyah, but “this could not support large-scale CW agent

production”.

• The possibility existed that Iraq had “a series of transportable production

facilities, although none have yet been identified, possibly as a result of denial

and deception”.

• Iraq had “the necessary command and control structure necessary to deliver

CBW weapons”. There were “no specifics on preferred delivery options” but they

could, in the future, include the L-29 Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV).

50.  It is clear from the documents on the No.10 files that Mr Blair read the papers.

19  Paper Defence Intelligence Analysis Staff, June 2002, ‘aide memoire on Weapons of Mass Destruction

and Proliferation’.

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