The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
495.
In answer to a
further question about what kind of necessity there might be to
go
back to the
UN, Mr Hoon responded that would “depend on the circumstances on
the
ground, the
nature of the information we had about the regime and crucially the
extent to
which
Saddam Hussein was or was not prepared to accede to existing …
resolutions.”
Pressed
further, Mr Hoon added that it would: “Depend on the context … But
as far as
I
understand the position legally we would be perfectly entitled to
use force as we have
done in the
past without the support of a United Nations Security Council
resolution.”
496.
A minute from
Mr Patey recorded that the media were “playing up
apparent
differences
between the Defence Secretary and Foreign Secretary over a legal
basis
for
military action. No.10 will seek to play this down at the lobby
briefing today”.179
He
concluded
that it would be “important not to get drawn in public on the legal
position
in respect
of what are, at this stage, hypothetical scenarios”.
497.
Lord Goldsmith
saw the transcripts of both interviews and wrote to Mr
Hoon
on 28 March
pointing out that:
“… the Law
Officers’ opinion has not been sought on the legality of possible
action
and I have
not therefore offered any views on the legal position. The clarity
of your
statement
and the apparently authoritative way it was produced puts me … in
a
difficult
position.
“I would
not want to be definitive until I have had the benefit of full
submissions …
Nonetheless
I think you should know that I see considerable difficulties in
being
satisfied
that military action would be justified on the basis of self
defence …
“I am aware
that another potential argument is that the breaches of Security
Council
resolutions
by Iraq would revive the authorisation to use force in …
resolution 678
(1990). I
would welcome detailed submissions on that argument … but, in
the
absence of
further action by the Security Council, there could be
considerable
difficulties
in justifying reliance on the original authorisation to use
force.”180
498.
Lord Goldsmith
concluded by drawing attention to the advice of the then
Law
Officers in
1997, and that he “would of course be happy to discuss this matter
with
you and
Jack Straw at any time”.
499.
Lord Goldsmith
sent Mr Straw a copy of his letter, but it was not sent to
No.10.
500.
Following a
discussion with Lord Goldsmith, Mr Hoon responded on 11 April
stating
that he had
been speaking “in principle” about acting in self defence “if it
were shown
that Iraq
had weapons of mass destruction which were capable of posing a
threat to the
179
Minute
Patey to Goulty, 25 March 2002, ‘Iraq: Military
Action’.
180
Letter
Goldsmith to Hoon, 28 March 2002, [untitled].
476