4.3 |
Iraq WMD assessments, October 2002 to March 2003
Government,
published on 24 September, became part of the baseline against
which
the UK
Government measured Iraq’s statements and future actions and the
success of
weapons
inspections.
12.
The Iraqi
Ministry of Foreign Affairs published a “detailed rebuttal” on 2
October,
which
described the UK dossier as “a series of lies and empty propaganda”
which was
“totally
inconsistent” with the facts and reports made by the UN Special
Commission
(UNSCOM)
and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).1
13.
The rebuttal
emphasised Iraq’s “intensive efforts” and co-operation
between
1991 and
1998 in implementing resolution 687 (1991) and other UN Security
Council
resolutions.
It also stated that Iraq had not imported any prohibited
material.
14.
Addressing the
dossier’s “claims about alleged activities after 1998”, the
Iraqi
rebuttal
stated:
•
The
“assumptions” about a nuclear programme were “groundless”. Iraq’s
imports
and
facilities were subject to strict monitoring, including through the
IAEA
safeguards
regime.
•
The
allegation that Iraq had tried to acquire uranium “from South
Africa” was
“a bogus
lie”.
•
There were
“no toxic chemical agents, precursors or chemical
weapons”;
and “no
capabilities to produce chemical or biological
agents”.
•
VX agent
production required “an advanced technology” which was
“not
available
in Iraq”. It had not obtained “any large scale or significant
production
of VX
agent” from equipment destroyed in 1997.
•
The
al-Muthanna site had been destroyed and was abandoned.
•
The
chlorine and phenol site at Fallujah 2 had produced chlorine for
water
purification
and chlorine was no longer subject to monitoring.
•
The
Ibn-Sina site produced material for civil industries and its
equipment had
been tagged
by UNSCOM.
•
The al-Qaqa
state company had no plant to produce phosgene and its
equipment
was tagged and monitored.
•
Iraq was
“completely clear of all biological weapons and agents” and did
“not
keep any
quantity of these agents”. The “botulinum protein” and “anthrax
slurry”
previously
produced had a “short shelf life”.
•
The
reaction to the allegation that mobile facilities were producing
biological
agent was
“astonishment”.
1
Minute
Miller to Manning, 4 October 2002, ‘The Dossier: Iraq’s Response’
attaching Email FCO [junior
official]
to Hamill, 3 October 2002, ‘Iraq’s reply on Blair’s Report’ and
Paper [CIC], [undated], ‘Iraq – Still
Playing
Games’.
291