7 |
Conclusions: Pre-conflict strategy and planning
“The
military part of this is hazardous but I will concentrate mainly on
the political
context for
success.”
87.
Mr Blair
stated that getting rid of Saddam Hussein was:
“… the
right thing to do. He is a potential threat. He could be
contained.
But containment
… is always risky. His departure would free up the
region.
And his regime
is … brutal and inhumane …”
88.
Mr Blair
told President Bush that the UN was the simplest way to encapsulate
a
“casus
belli” in some defining way, with an ultimatum to Iraq once
military forces started
to build up
in October. That might be backed by a UN resolution.
89.
Mr Blair
thought it unlikely that Saddam Hussein intended to allow
inspectors to
return. If
he did, the JIC had advised that Iraq would obstruct the work of
the inspectors.
That could
result in a material breach of the obligations imposed by the
UN.
90.
A workable
military plan to ensure the collapse of the regime would be
required.
91.
The Note
reflected Mr Blair’s own views. The proposals had not been
discussed
or agreed
with his colleagues.
92.
Sir David
Manning, Mr Blair’s Foreign Policy Adviser, told President
Bush that it
would be
impossible for the UK to take part in any action against Iraq
unless it went
through the
UN.
93.
When
Mr Blair spoke to President Bush on 31 July the “central
issue of a casus
belli” and
the need for further work on the optimal route to achieve that was
discussed.32
Mr Blair
said that he wanted to explore whether the UN was the right route
to set an
ultimatum
or whether it would be an obstacle.
94.
In late
August, the FCO proposed a strategy of coercion, using a UN
resolution
to issue
an ultimatum to Iraq to admit the weapons inspectors and disarm.
The UK
was seeking
a commitment from the Security Council to take action in the event
that
Saddam Hussein
refused or subsequently obstructed the inspectors.
95.
Reflecting the
level of public debate and concern, Mr Blair decided in
early
September
that an explanation of why action was needed to deal with Iraq
should
be published.
96.
In his press
conference at Sedgefield on 3 September, Mr Blair
indicated that time
and
patience were running out and that there were difficulties with the
existing policy
of containment.33
He also
announced the publication of the Iraq dossier, stating
that:
32
Rycroft to
McDonald, 31 July 2002, ‘Iraq: Prime Minister’s Phone Call
with President Bush, 31 July’.
33
The
National Archives, 3 September 2002, PM
press conference [at
Sedgefield].
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